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ABSTRACT
COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION
ŞENOL, ÖZKAN
M. A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
September 2003
During the Cold War years, the Black Sea was treated as a barrier and borderline
rather than an integral part of the European politics. With the end of the Cold War, The
Black Sea area emerged as a region on the physical and intellectual map of Europe with its
political, economical, and military dynamics.
This thesis is a study on the role of cooperative initiatives to increase security in
the Black Sea region within the framework of cooperative security. It aims to analyze
the cooperative security efforts in the region with a certain emphasis on the post-Cold
War developments.
This study argues that the strategic importance of the Black Sea region to the
West, and to Europe in particular has increased substantially in recent years. Provided the
region’s geostrategic position as a natural link between Europe and Asia, and between
Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes a vital trade link as well as an
important area of transit. Moreover, instability and potential for conflict in the region, its
energy sources, and its economic prospects matter to the international community. At the
same time this study argues that the BSEC, GUUAM, and BLACKSEAFOR as main
regional cooperative initiatives have contributed to the peace, security and stability of the
Black Sea region with their various activities. It evaluates that the OSCE, NATO, and the
EU as wider European organizations have played an important role in projecting security
and stability to the region through their various mechanisms.
Keywords: Black Sea region, cooperative security, concept, regional cooperation, energy,
conflict, environment, EU, NATO, OSCE, BSEC, GUUAM, BLACKSEAFOR.
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ÖZET
KARADENİZ BÖLGESİNDEKİ GÜVENLİK İŞBİRLİĞİ
ŞENOL, ÖZKAN
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
Eylül 2003
Soğuk Savaş yıllarında, Karadeniz Avrupa politikasının entegre edilmiş bir
parçası olmaktan çok, bir engel ve sınır hattı olarak algılanmıştı. Soğuk savaşın sona
ermesiyle birlikte, Karadeniz havzası kendi politik, ekonomik ve askeri dinamikleriyle
Avrupanın fiziki ve entelektüel haritasında bir bölge olarak belirdi.
Bu tez işbirliği insiyatiflerinin Karadeniz bölgesinin güvenliğini artırmadaki
rolünü güvenlik işbirliği çerçevesinde inceleyen bir çalışmadır ve bölgedeki güvenlik
işbirliği çabalarını soğuk savaş sonrası dönem üzerinde yoğunlaşarak analiz etmeyi
hedeflemektedir.
Bu çalışma Karadeniz bölgesinin stratejik öneminin Batı ve özellikle Avrupa için
son yıllarda önemli ölçüde arttığını ileri sürmektedir. Bölgenin Avrupa ve Asya, Orta Asya
ve Orta Doğu arasındaki doğal konumu düşünüldüğünde, bölgenin hayati öneme haiz
ticaret, ulaştırma ve nakil alanı olduğu söylenebilir. Bunun da ötesinde, istikrarsızlık ve
bölgedeki çatışma potansiyeli, enerji kaynakları ve ekonomik olanaklar uluslararası
toplumun ilgisini çekmektedir. Aynı zamanda bu çalışma Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği
Teşkilatının, GUUAM’ın ve Karadeniz Gücünün ana bölgesel işbirliği insiyatifleri olarak
birçok yönleriyle bölgedeki barış, huzur ve istikrara katkıda bulundukları belirtilmektedir.
Ayrıca AGİT, NATO, ve AB’nin Avrupa’nın daha büyük örgütleri olarak birçok
mekanizmalarla bölgede güvenlik ve istikrarının sağlanmasında önemli bir rol oynadıkları
vurgulanmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Karadeniz bölgesi, güvenlik işbirliği, konsept, bölgesel işbirliği,
enerji, çatışma, çevre, AB, NATO, AGİT, KEİT, GUUAM, Karadeniz Gücü.
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1CHAPTER 1
  INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, many
analysts have emphasized the lessening of global factors and the increasing weight of
regional forces in world politics that had operated under the surface of superpower
confrontation. Especially in the decade after the Cold War, international and national
politics have been increasingly shaped by regional as well as sub-national and local
dynamics. In this study the post-Cold War security relations in the Black Sea region will
be analyzed from the perspective of cooperative security. This subject of research is of
interest due to the increased significance of the Black Sea region that came with the end
of the bipolar rivalry.
NATO, with its eastward expansion, and the EU have increased their role in
shaping the security initiatives of the region. The enlargement process of the EU will
continually transform the region in Europe’s direct neighborhood causing the Black Sea
Region’s security and stability to become vital for European security. The wars in the
Balkans proved the value of the concept of “indivisible security”. Located along existing
or potential routes of energy transportation from Central Asia to Europe, the region is
becoming a focus of the grand “geopolitics of oil”.
2 The aim of choosing this subject rests upon three concerns. The first concern is
to provide a good understanding of the role of cooperative security efforts in the Black
Sea region in promoting peace, security and stability. The second concern is to stress the
growing significance of the Black Sea region. The third is to provide comprehensive
data about the regional dynamics of the Black Sea region to the academic, business, and
policy communities, as there are currently only a few sources concerned with this.
When analyzing the cooperative security activities in the Black Sea region, this
study does not aim to cover all aspects of security, but rather focus on the issues,
problems and challenges which are shared by all or several Black Sea countries.  In line
with this consideration this thesis will attempt to provide answers to the questions stated
below:
What is the meaning of cooperative security? What is its relevance concerning
the Black Sea security?
What are the geopolitical characteristics of the Black Sea Region? (Where are
the outer limits of the Black Sea Region? What are the interests of the major players of
the region? What are the main regional security challenges of the region?)
What are the regional cooperative arrangements in the Black Sea region and
what can be said about their efficiency?
 What are the roles of wider European organizations such as the OSCE, NATO,
and the EU in Black Sea security?
                By these questions, while the scope of this thesis is restricted to the viewpoint
of foreign policy considerations, it will be attempted to explain the contributions of
cooperative security mechanisms to the security, stability and development in the region.
3To fulfill these purposes, the second chapter of this thesis will be devoted to the
analysis of the relevance of the concept of cooperative security in regards to the security
issues in the Black Sea region. In this chapter, some new characteristics of the concept
of security will be outlined and a framework for analysis will be presented. Finally, the
same chapter will deal with the cooperative security practices of NATO, the EU, and the
OSCE.
Chapter 3 will provide information about the main regional dynamics of the
Black Sea region. It will briefly examine the overall geopolitical setting of the region in
the light of Post-Cold War realities. In the first section, the description of the region will
be presented after examining different points of view concerning it. The second section
will stress the importance of the region. The national interests of the main players will
be briefly examined. Moreover, various challenges to regional security and the conflicts
such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestr, Abkhazian-Georgian, Ossetian-Georgian, and
Russian- Chechen conflict will be summarized.
Chapter 4 will give a general overview of regional/subregional cooperative
arrangements in the region such as BSEC, GUUAM, and BLACKSEAFOR. These
initiatives will be examined within three separate sections. In each section, their
historical background, their main characteristics and their contributions to regional
security will be studied.
The fifth chapter will focus specifically on the regional perspectives of
international organizations such as the OSCE, NATO, and the EU. Their activities and
roles in enhancing the security and stability of the region will be examined.
The last chapter will outline the answers to questions we posed in the beginning
of this study and a brief overall evaluation will be presented.
4This study is mainly descriptive. It examines regional security issues and
development from a historical-comparative perspective. It is based on primary sources
such as international agreements and governmental policy statements as well as
secondary sources such as scholarly books, periodicals, newspaper articles, and articles
available on the internet. Although there is a rich literature on the post-Cold War period,
there are only a few books concerned with Black Sea regional security. Therefore, we
mainly used conference papers, journal and newspaper articles and official documents as
our sources.
5CHAPTER 2
THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY
2.1. A Framework for Analysis
With the end of the Cold War, security understanding has changed drastically.
While the organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment were
invaluable in guiding thought and action in the Cold War era, cooperative security is the
corresponding principle for international security in the Post-Cold War era.1Due to the
change in the international conjuncture, the dominance of traditional security studies has
been challenged by new approaches to the concept of security.
On one hand, debates on the meaning and the concept of security have greatly
increased. In the post-Cold War period, the security perception has changed. Increased
intrastate conflicts, international terrorism, drug trafficking, the increased flow of small
arms, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and environmental deterioration pave the
way for looking at alternative security approaches. Economic performance rather than
military capability started to be seen as the measure of a state’s power. There are many
internal factors that impede the growth of economic activities.2 New concepts such as
                                                          
1 Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbruner. 1992. “A New Concept of Cooperative
Security,” Brooking Occasional Papers. Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, p.9.
2 Syed Muhammad Ibrahim BP. 2002. “A Cooperative Security Framework For South Asia,” Paper was
presented at the South Asian Strategic Conference “Post 9/11 Developments-Implications For South Asia”
held at Nagarkot, Nepal on 18June 2002, Organized by Regional Center For Strategic Studies, Colombo,
Sri Lanka, available at http://www.rcss.org/papers/9%20Ibrahim%20.pdf.
6human security, societal security, indivisible security, security interdependence and new
sectors consisting of political, economical, societal, environmental, in addition to the
military sector3 have been introduced. While the military security is called ‘hard’, other
threats to security are labeled ‘soft’. These terms and concepts are products of efforts to
find alternative ways to ensure security. In other words, they are dimensions of security
viewed from different paradigmatic perspectives.
On the other hand, the level of analysis problem has become complicated. It
was also assumed that total security is not possible with a one-dimensional approach but
required collective action.4 All of the above mentioned potential threats to security
require intergovernmental or even trans-state actions. Bereft of Cold War patron-client
relations, it has been necessary that international relations thinking give more attention
to the gap between domestic politics and global international politics.5 In order to bridge
this gap, the international community increasingly showed a deep concern over various
aspects of security at national, regional and international levels.  Buzan’s advice
suggesting five levels in security analysis seems convincing:
              1) International (global) system,
2) International sub-system (regional),
3) Units (national),
4) Sub-units (sub-national), and
                                                          
3 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security : A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder,
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., p.7.
4 Syed Muhammad Ibrahim BP, op. cit.
5 Peter Woodward. 1998. “Regional Security in North-East Africa,” available at http://www.eiipd.org/
publications /occasional/20papers7regional_security.html
75) Individuals.6
This approach is very useful in understanding the implications of many issues,
which are on the agenda of today’s international relations, such as the global political
economy, nationalism, regionalism, and threats to all kinds of security at all levels. This
analytical framework also makes it easy to understand and evaluate the main
characteristics of regional politics in a specific region or sub-region (In addition to these
levels, the sub-regional level can be categorized as a level between the regional and
national levels in international relations).
No single trend over the past decade deserves more careful analysis than the
remarkable growth of cooperation among the countries of Europe, Asia and North
America. Many new international organizations have been born, and a few of the old
ones have been successfully transformed.7 Regional and sub-regional levels of analysis
enhanced their importance relative to the Cold War period and to the end of the bipolar
rivalry, which had had an empowering and dominant role on regional dynamics.
Compared with the Cold War era, it is not making an exaggeration to say that Post-Cold
War developments decreased the role of global actors on regional relations to some
extent. The end of the bipolar rivalry gave states the opportunity of acting more freely,
especially at a regional level. From the Barents Sea area, the Baltic Sea region, through
Central Europe and the Balkans down to the Black Sea region, new frameworks and
                                                          
6 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, op. cit., pp.5-6.
7Richard Cohen. 2001. “From Individual Security to International Stability,” in Richard Cohen and
Michael Mihalka. “Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order,” The Marshall Center
Papers, No. 3 The George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies, available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/cor05/
8institutions have been established8 and a lot of initiatives have been vitalized since the
end of the Cold War. This has been done sometimes with the support of outside powers
and sometimes with sole intentions of countries situated in the same region. All forms of
regional cooperation whether supported by top-down or bottom-up approaches, took
their right place on the agenda of international security studies.
 Taking into account most of the post-Cold War realities, the concept of
cooperative security seems among the most appropriate and consistent with its analytical
framework providing the necessary analytical tools for examining the security relations
among the countries situated in the Black Sea region. It covers the whole range of issues
from soft to hard security. It confirms the idea that international relations follow their
way through interactions among all the above-mentioned levels of relations.
2.2. The Concept
The use of the term cooperative security is relatively new, but the notion that
states wish to work together to address security challenges has a long history.9 The
concept of cooperative security has evolved over time. Its evolution goes back to the
origins of the CSCE, which aimed, on the one hand, to further security, economic, and
political as well as cultural cooperation between Warsaw Pact (WP) countries and
Western Europe and North America, on the other, to prevent a nuclear war, in the early
1970s, and in particular to the notion of confidence building.10 After emerging from the
                                                          
8 Bronislav Gemerek. 13 October 1998. “Keynote Speech at International Conference on Subregional
Cooperation,” Stockholm, available at http://www.msz.gov.pl/english/polzar/osce/keynotespeech.html.
9 Randall Forsberg 1992. "Why Cooperative Security? Why Now?” Peace and Democracy News. Winter,
pp. 9-13.
10 Olav F. Knudsen. 2001. “The Concept of Cooperative Security and Its Relationship to Policy,” Paper
was prepared for the panel “Reframing the Security Agenda of the 21st Century”, ISA 42nd Annual
Convention, Chicago, February 21-24, p.2, available at http://www.home.datacomm.ch/sbrem
/ISA2001.CoopSec.pdf
9CSCE internal diplomatic parlance, it became the issue for the Pacific regional
conference in 1988.11 In 1990, the term ‘cooperative security’ became part of official
NATO language when the Final Communiqué of the Brussels Ministerial (Dec. 17-18,
1990) cited one of NATO’s aims as being ‘... expanding our active search for a co-
operative approach to security...’12
Cooperative security often involved “cooperation among adversaries” through
multilateralism and various forms of international “regimes” that embraced expected
norms and behaviors among the actors. With its expansion in the post-Cold War era that
encompassed economics and the environment, the notion of cooperative security must
also be expanded in a way that does not lose its original focus. While states remain the
main referent of security and the focus remains on threats from other states, including
(or perhaps even primarily) military threats, the problems they confront cannot be
resolved solely through their own efforts. They also call for the stable and peaceful
international environment necessary to advance the ever more highly prized goal of
economic progress.13 Cooperative security can be defined as "a process whereby
countries with common interests work jointly through agreed mechanisms to reduce
tensions and suspicion, resolve or mitigate disputes, build confidence, enhance economic
development prospects, and maintain stability in their regions."14 This definition gives
ample scope to explore how cooperation can be promoted to deal with new concerns
                                                          
11 Ibid., p.2.
12 Ibid.
13 Syed Muhammad Ibrahim BP, op. cit., pp.1-8.
14Michael Moodie January 2000. “Cooperative Security: Implications For National Security And
International Relations,” Sand98-0505/14 Unlimited Release, Chemical And Biological Arms Control
Institute, available at http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/Links/about/papers/SAND98-0505-14/index.html
10
while focusing primarily on cooperative security’s relationship to violent conflict and
the instruments by which it is waged.
The basic focus of cooperative security is to promote a security framework in
which a wide range of co-operations that take place between politically diverse actors,
through a network of institutions can lessen the likelihood of war among states, and to
ensure a more secure environment in order to move from a security system based on
deterrence to one based on reassurance.15 Cooperative security is practiced not only
between adversaries, but also among non-like-minded actors as well as supposed friends.
Cooperative security does not ignore military or strategic interests of a state but
recommends a mechanism for resolution of conflicts through dialogue. The core of
cooperative security is to replace negative conflict with positive competition in multiple
areas including the field of trade and commerce, as well as defense and security.
However, according to a pessimistic approach, the objective of cooperative security is
not a creation of stability or resolution of disputes. It calls for neither a fundamental
change in the existing system, nor a creation of broadly accepted legitimate international
and regional orders in which the states, of which the common aim is to diffuse actual or
potential frictions/conflicts among participants by political dialogue, information sharing
and transparency.16 Its main purpose is to limit the number of clashes as less as
possible.17 Adopting such a limited thinking may bring nothing except pessimism and
inability to take action. It may also obstruct more peaceful changes created with the help
                                                          
15 Randall Forsberg, op.cit., p.8.
16Moonis Ahmar. 2002. “Developing a Cooperative Security Framework for South Asia,” Paper was
presented at the South Asian Strategic Conference organized by the Regional Center for Strategic Studies
on “Post 9/11 Developments-Implications for South Asia” held at Kathmandu, Nepal on June 16-19,2002,
available at http://www.rcss.org/papers/10%20Moonis%20.pdf
17 Ibid.
11
of hopeful expectations. It is apparent that this view is in contrast with the liberal view
and the constructivist assumption that cooperative security thinking will lead to the
creation of a secure community in the long run. It should not be forgotten that
cooperative security is a methodology to create conditions, between states as well as
other actors of international relations, of a sustained process of economic, cultural,
communications and defense cooperation. The idea behind cooperative security is to
gradually reduce the level of hostility and tension by promoting substantial trust and
confidence in the benefits of sustaining the process of cooperation.18
Despite different definitions of cooperative security, it should not be ignored
that the idea of cooperative security differs from the traditional idea of collective
security19. Cooperative security is designed to prevent conflict in the long term and is
promoted to ensure that organized aggression cannot be implemented on any large scale,
whereas collective security is an arrangement for managing a joint response toward
aggression by deterring it through military preparation and defeating it if it occurs.20
Despite their differences it cannot be said that two forms of a security system are
mutually exclusive and may not coexist within (parts of) a security regime.21 The UN is
                                                          
18 Ibid.
19 Cooperative security should be distinguished from collective security, collective defense, and common
security. “Collective security: the agreement of a group to jointly punish aggression committed by any of
them against any other in the group. Collective defense: the joint organization of defense as (e.g.) in
NATO. Common security: a program for action based (inter alia) on the view that security is an
international problem shared among adversaries rather than a national problem of any one country, and
that traditional measures which increase the security of one state (or group) at the expense of another (e.g.,
si vis pacem,para bellum) exacerbate the problem rather than solving it.” cited from  Olav F. Knudsen, op.
cit.
20Janne E. Nolan, ed. 1994. Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, p.5.
21Elisabeth Johansson. 2001. “Cooperative Security in the 21st Century? NATO’s Mediterranean
Dialogue,” Universidad De Granada, 5-9 De Noviembre De 2001, available at http://www.ugr.es/~ceas/
Documentacion%20Mediterraneo/2.pdf op. cit.
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the best example for an organization practicing collective security and cooperative
security at the same time. Indeed a collective security joint response (or a military
alliance) may function as the ultimate resort to deal with an armed attack if all
preventive cooperative security measures have failed. Evans distinguishes cooperative
security from the concepts of “common security”, “collective security” and
“comprehensive security”. He claims that both common and collective security are
inclined to over-emphasize military aspects of security despite their focus on non-
aggressive and preventive measures such as confidence building. He believes that
“comprehensive security” has a weak descriptive force within its wider agenda. He also
claims that the concept of cooperative security covers the content of both common and
collective security while also embracing some important multi-dimensional aspects of
comprehensive security.22
 A collective study from the Brookings Institution advocates a confined
definition of the concept of cooperative security. Although the development of a
cooperative security regime holds normative aspirations, it does not aspire to eliminate
all weapons, to prevent all forms of violence, to provide peaceful ends of conflicts, or to
harmonize all political values. It provides a framework for the international community
to organize responses to the all forms of threats and challenges.23 It is more of a practical
and pragmatic recognition that, although armed conflict is likely to be a continued
feature of the international system in the foreseeable future, concrete measures can be
taken to limit the scale and maybe even the number of conflicts in the short run. But this
                                                          
22Stephanie Lawson (ed.) 1995. The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond.
Canberra: Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd. and Department of International Relations, RSPAS,
Australian National University, p.9.
23Janne E. Nolan, op. cit., p.8.
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strategy may limit the scope of cooperative security by prioritizing military measures.
All forms of cooperation including economic, political, military, transparency, gradual
disarmament, industrial conversion, demobilization, demilitarization, all forms of
CBMs, and even humanitarian intervention might be considered as elements of the
concept of cooperative security.
2.2.1. Principles of cooperative security
As mentioned in the earlier definitions of the concept, a cooperative security
system implies general acceptance of and compliance with binding commitments
limiting military capabilities and actions. Instead of mistrust and deterrence, a
cooperative system rests on following principles: 24
1) motivation to end confrontations and demonstrated will to follow such a
policy;25
2) confidence based on openness, transparency and predictability;
3) mutual reassurance;
4) legitimacy; which depends on the acceptance by members that the military
constraints of the regime substantially ensure their security. The establishment of a
shared ‘rule book’ of fundamental norms and principles governing the domestic and
international behavior of states is a prerequisite for creating a cooperative security
system.
                                                          
24Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1996. “A Future Security Agenda for Europe,” This
report was prepared by he Independent Working Group Established by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent international
institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and
disarmament, available at http://www.editors.sipri.se/pubs/iwg/iwg-report.pdf
25Olav F. Knudsen summarizes the characteristics of cooperative security as: 1) inclusiveness (that one
seeks cooperation with one’s adversary) 2) weak confidence in the adversary 3) motivation to end
confrontations, 4) demonstrated will to implement such a policy and states that “In relation to the concept
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5) comprehensiveness; defined as acknowledgement of the link between the
maintenance of peace and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as
well as economic, cultural, legal and environmental cooperation.
6) indivisibility; which demands a common effort in pursuing security
interests, as the security of each state or group of states is inseparably linked to that of
all others;
7) cooperative approach; as embodied in existing complementary and
mutually reinforcing institutions, including European and transatlantic organizations,
multilateral and bilateral undertakings, and various forms of regional and subregional
cooperation.26 The premise being that security cannot be obtained by unilateral action
and requires cooperative approaches across actors within a country as well as cross-
national and intergovernmental.27
8) inclusiveness; referring both to participants - the non-like-minded as well
as the like-minded.
9) promotion of "habits of dialogue"; providing regional actors with the long-
term benefits of undertaking regular consultations with the possibilities of establishing
more formal and even official decision-making multilateral meetings on a regular
schedule.28
                                                                                                                                                                          
of security community, this is the name of the first beginning of a process that may perhaps lead to a
security community later on” in Olav F. Knudsen, op. cit.
26Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, op. cit.
27 Amitav Acharya. 2001. “Debating Human Security,” paper was presented to the 15th Asia Pacific Round
Table in Dewitt, David B. And Amitav Acharya (1996) "Cooperative Security and Development
Assistance: The Relationship between Security and Development with Reference to Eastern Asia", Eastern
Asia Policy Papers No.16. P.9-10.Toronto: Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies, available at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/acharya.pdf.
28 Ibid.
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Regarding to the notion of cooperative security, Evans emphasizes the
following characteristics:
It is multi-dimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasize
reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not
restrictive in membership; favors multilateralism over bilateralism; does not
privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes states are the
principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have
an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security
institutions, but does not reject them either; and... above all, stresses the value of
creating ‘habits of dialog’ on a multilateral basis.29
Although the statement of Evans contains contradiction and ambiguity about
the necessity of formal security institutions, most of the characteristics underlined by
him seem compatible with the above-mentioned principles of cooperative security.
Any organization or state claiming that it is acting under the umbrella of
cooperative security should comply with these principles. But these principles should
not be evaluated in a strict manner.  Such an attitude might be categorizing and
restricting and it may lead to contradictions between various principles of cooperative
security. The existence of gray areas in social sciences should not be denied, apart from
black and white. Some analysts claim that cooperative security is only an accessible
process for states that share the same values.30 Such an idea is not consistent with the
principle of inclusiveness and it may prevent the promotion of cooperative security.
Mihalka’s contrasting view asserts that even states not sharing common values can
                                                          
29 Gareth Evans. 1993. Cooperating for Peace: the Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. St Leonards:
Allen and Unwin, p.16.
30Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka, op cit., p.12. Cohen defines four security rings consisting of
individual security, collective security, collective defense, and promoting security. He claims that NATO
is the only cooperative security organization, which operates effectively in four rings of his cooperative
security model. His paper argues that EU is moving toward becoming a de facto cooperative security
organization with its current emphasis on European Security and Defense Policy.
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cooperate, if their ruling elites believe that working together is better than acting alone
and that they rely on a common future. He also points out that many members of the
OSCE and the ASEAN, organizations acting in compliance with the concept of
cooperative security, are quasi-authoritarian, transitional democracies, and not
consolidated democracies.31 That’s why, a low-level cooperative security between the
states not sharing liberal democratic values can be mentioned.
Although the EU and NATO can be evaluated as cooperative security regimes
acting under the principles of a cooperative security regime, it is difficult to mention the
existence of a cooperative security regime in the Black Sea region. However, the BSEC,
GUUAM, and BLACKSEAFOR can be thought as regional cooperative arrangements
acting under some principles of cooperative security.
2.2.2. Cooperative security in practice
Cooperative security has been practiced all over the world, especially in
Europe. As mentioned earlier, states have had a relatively more flexible international
conjuncture after the end of the rigid bipolar system of the Cold War era. States have
faced many non-traditional security challenges, which they have not been capable of
dealing with alone. While many regional initiatives and organizations were being
established, old ones had to make necessary changes in their structure to adapt to the
new security environment. Cooperative security efforts against international terrorism
have increased their significance especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Regional and international organizations and initiatives, whose purpose is to
create a more secure environment via interactions and dialog processes, among all kinds
of international actors over economic, political, military, socio-cultural, and
                                                          
31Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka, op. cit., p.31.
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environmental issues, should be considered as the best confidence building measures
(CBMs), and the best indicators of the implementation of the concept of cooperative
security. Stating briefly32 the cooperative security efforts of NATO, the EU, and the
OSCE, together with regional initiatives, will provide good examples of the
implementation of cooperative security in and around the Black Sea region.
The Alliance’s cooperative security practices, which were designed to
contribute to security and stability through political dialogue, transparency, information
and confidence building, through specific security cooperation, have largely been based
on three pillars. These are enlargement, special bilateral accords (Russia and Ukraine)
and the creation of partnership initiatives. The 1992 North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC), the 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF),
the 1995 Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),
which in 1997 replaced the NACC, are among the main initiatives. Based on the notion
cooperative security, these partnership initiatives and outreach programs, have become
the centerpiece of the Alliance’s intent to create new security architecture for Europe
and beyond for the 21st century.33 The PfP program has become the most prominent
instrument for the purpose of practical cooperation. It includes areas such as the
democratic control of the military, developed contact on all levels, preparation of joint
exercises and conducting joint peacekeeping operations. In this dialog process, partner
countries and members are cooperating in the field of military security on a bilateral
basis, for instance, the incorporation of officers from the Central and Eastern European
                                                          
32 The role of the NATO, OSCE, and EU in the Black Sea security will be discussed comprehensively in
the 4th Chapter.
33 Elisabeth Johansson, op cit.
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countries in national military staff colleges and higher education programs.34 NATO
officials are well aware of the fact that NATO’s enlargement process should be
conducted in parallel with the economic integration process, which is along the way of
the enlargement of the EU.35 It should also sustain the necessary broadening and
deepening of cooperation between the Alliance and the interested Central, Eastern, and
Southern European Countries.36 It is an undeniable fact that both enlargement processes
will contribute significantly to extending the security, stability and prosperity enjoyed by
their members to other democratic European states. Building cooperative security can be
enhanced through the ongoing enlargement processes of the EU and NATO. Such a
policy can ensure regional stability and avoid new dividing lines in Europe. Thanks to
the enlargement process, NATO’s cooperative role in Baltic and Black Sea security
might be enhanced to a large extent.
The EU’s project of subregionalism can be assessed as a product of cooperative
security thinking. EU officials use the term “sub region” in place of the term “region” in
order to avoid causing marginalization and creating new dividing lines in Europe. The
EU has established formal relation in terms of its foreign policy, in the central and
eastern parts of Europe. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Council of Baltic
Sea States (CBSS), the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Southeast Europe
Cooperation Initiative (SECI), the South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
                                                          
34 Igno Peters  (ed.) 1996. New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of Internal Institution; Reforming the
UN, NATO, EU and CSCE since 1989. New York: St. Martin’s Press, p.210.
35 NATO. 1995.  “NATO Study on Enlargement,” available at http://www.nato.int.
36 NATO Defense College (ed.) 1997. Cooperative Security Arrangements in Europe. Euro-Atlantic
Security Studies. New York: Peter Lang. P.87.
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(EMP) are among the initiatives that the EU has interacted with. 37  The EU supports and
provides funds for subregional and regional initiatives. A good relationship between
neighboring states is a criterion for membership of the candidate countries. Thus, the EU
encourages cooperative security initiatives in its periphery to ensure peace and stability.
The OSCE’s attempts to promote dialogue and decrease tensions by the
implementation of CSBMs38 and cooperative security principles on wide range of
activities can be evaluated as cooperative security efforts. Similar to NATO, the OSCE
has adopted a whole set of new assignments including assistance to the democratization
process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), improving minority rights standards, the
peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, and crisis management short of
peace enforcement operations. The High Commissioner on National Minorities
(HCNM), the Chairman in Office, the Secretariat and the Conflict Prevention Center in
Vienna have been applied as new organs and instruments to contribute to the solution of
conflicts or containment of dangerous trouble areas.39 The OSCE framework, which
contains the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), has provided an
important framework for arms control in Europe. In the post-Cold War period, despite
its financial and coordination problems, the OSCE has been at the forefront of crisis
management and conflict resolution in a number of serious disputes and conflicts in such
countries and regions as Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
                                                          
37 Elisabeth Johansson. 2001. “EU and its Near Neighborhood: Subregionalization in the Baltic Sea and in
the Mediterranean,” Universidad De Granada, 5-9 De Noviembre De 2001, available at
http://www.unige.ch/ieug/B7__Johansson.pdf
38 These measures contain military security measures adopted by OSCE members in Stockholm (1986), in
Vienna (1990 and 1992). The Vienna document 1992, officially replaced the Vienna document 1990, is
the first agreement that places actual limits on military activities.
39 OSCE. 1994. “Annual Report,” this report was edited by the Secretary General, Vienna, pp. 6-7,
available at http://www.osce.org.
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Tajikistan, the Central Asian republics, Latvia and Estonia, Moldavia, Ukraine, and the
former Yugoslavia.40
To put it briefly, regional and/or subregional cooperation offers a means of
building confidence at the local and interstate levels in the Black Sea. The main essence
of the cooperative efforts taking place in all of the security sectors in the Black Sea
region can be grasped with the concept of cooperative security, suggesting wider
security agenda and cooperation among all kinds of actors in the international arena. In
this regard, the activities of the cooperative security initiatives such as BSEC, GUUAM,
and the BLACKSEAFOR in the region might be analyzed meaningfully within the
framework of cooperative security. Contributions from the wider European
organizations, including the OSCE, NATO, and the EU, to the peace, security and
stability of the Black Sea region might also be seen in compliance with the core
principles of cooperative security.
An analysis of the geopolitical setting of the Black Sea region will show the
value of cooperative efforts and the necessity of a cooperative security understanding in
the region.
                                                          
40 NATO Defense College, op. cit., p.102.
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CHAPTER 3
GEOPOLITICAL SETTING OF THE BLACK SEA
REGION
3.1. Is the Black Sea a Region?
Before answering this question, it should be clarified what is meant by
“region”. Firstly, the definition of a “region” should be made to answer the above
question. It is a very difficult task to resolve this issue to everyone’s satisfaction.
Concerning our subject, the definition of a “region” should contain geographical,
political, economical, and military aspects of states situated in the same region.
In order to identify a region, many analysts emphasize the following criteria:41
1) Self-consciousness of members that they constitute a region, and
perceptions by others that one exists,
2) Geographical proximity of members,
3) A degree of autonomy and distinctiveness within the global system,
4) Regular and intense interactions, and dialogue processes (remarkable
interdependence),
5) A high level of political, economic, and cultural similarities.
                                                          
41 David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.) 1997. Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, p.26.
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A region can also be defined as a set of countries that are, or believe they are,
politically interdependent. Constructivist theories perceive regions as socially created
entities that have their meaning and importance because states treat them as sharing a
common area and future. Critical theories define regions as products of region-building
processes. Whether these processes are bottom-up or top-down, they are for special
political purposes.42 Region-building processes should not be treated, as if their results
were always negative. It should not be forgotten that under some conditions, countries
that perceive themselves in a region might be more cooperative.43 The Black Sea area
may be seen as a good example of this.
Cooperative efforts, including regional cooperation arrangements (BSEC and
GUUAM), various kinds of CSBMs (CFE Treaty, BLACKSEAFOR, PfP), are
indicators of self-consciousness of the region. The Black Sea plays a unifying rather
than a dividing role and it enables the region to meet the geographical proximity
criterion. The above-mentioned structures, especially the BSEC, allow intense regular
interactions. It is a geopolitical entity and a network of bilateral, trilateral and
multilateral links. For now however, it is difficult to say a particularly high level of
political, economic, and cultural affinities, but it seems that this criterion might be
fulfilled thanks to ongoing cooperative relations. There is also a need for essential
regional characteristics to be addressed, since the political will of the governments to
                                                          
42 Iver B. Neumann. 1992. Regions in International Theory. Research Report No.162. Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs.
43 David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
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develop a region is in place.44 Today, it can easily be said that the Black Sea area is
certainly more of a region than it was in early 1990s.
The term “Black Sea region” can be defined as the area covered by the eleven
states participating in the BSEC (See Figure 1). The countries of the Black Sea region
consist of six littoral states- Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine-
and other more or less adjacent countries- Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, and
Moldova.45
Figure 1: Map of the Black Sea region46
                                                          
44 The EastWest Institute. 16-17 October 2000. “Cooperative Efforts in Security of the Black Sea Region:
Security Challenges and Cooperative Responses,” Conference report of the Black Sea Strategy Group
First Meeting held in Bucharest, Romania, available at http://www.ewis.org.
45 Yannis Valinakis. 1999. The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe. Chaillot
Papers. Institute for Security Studies, p. ix.
46 Available at http://www.theodora.com/maps.
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The Black Sea region has become one of the foreign policy dimensions of all
the regional states. Moreover, the European dimension is the top priority for the foreign
policies of many countries in the Black Sea region. From a wider perspective, the Black
Sea area can be treated as one of the sub regions in the European continent. However,
calling this area a region should not lead to misperceptions. The term region has a
simple meaning and might be useful in analyzing the realities and dynamics of the Black
Sea region.
3.2. Geopolitical Importance of the Region
During the Cold-War years, the southern and northern shores of the Black Sea
remained divided by ideological rivalries. The Black Sea was treated as a barrier and
borderline rather than an integral part of European politics. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea area emerged as a region on
the physical and intellectual map of Europe with its political, economic, and military
dynamics.47
              According to the modern theories of geopolitics, including the works of well-
known geopoliticians, Mackinder, Spykman, Mahan, Schaclian, the Black Sea is situated
in an important geographical place.48  The Black Sea region lies at the center of the three
strategically important areas: the Balkans, the Caspian Sea basin and the Caucasus.
Within this context, this region has vital importance for the promotion of peace, stability
                                                          
47 Tunç Aybak (ed.) 2001. Politics of the Black Sea. London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, p. xi.
48 Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı (The Turkish War Colleges Command).  Mayıs 1995. Karadeniz
Ekonomik İşbirliği ve Türkiye  (The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Turkey). Istanbul: Harp
Akademileri Basım Evi, p. 2.
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and security in all these areas.49 Providing the region’s geostrategic position linking
Europe and Asia, and Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes an indispensable
trade link as well as important area of transit.50 It is true that the prospects for the Black
Sea region to become the center of an energy transportation (See Figure 2) and trade
network are very real. This network links the Caspian region in the East with Europe in
the West, Russia and Ukraine in the North and Turkey with its Mediterranean hinterland
in the South. 51The region’s strategic meaning is due to the transportation corridors and
existence of giant oil and gas reserves in the area. Due to its energy resources and
economic prospects, instability in the region may cause negative implications for the
international community.
Figure 2: Map of all pipelines in the Black Sea region (as of April 2002)52
                                                          
49 Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p. 53.
50 Yannis Valinakis, op. cit., p. 1.
51 M. L. Myrianthis. May 2001. “Eurasian Oil and Gas Routes in the Twenty-First Century,” Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies, 1(2): 124.
52 Available at http://www.users.qwest.net/~kryopak/BlackSea.html.
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In geo-economic terms, with its nearly 330 million population, this region
attracts the attention of many countries. The region possesses enormous potential for
economic prosperity and integration with the world economy.53 The region also has a
potentially huge consumer market. Even though not directly involved with the Black Sea
region they have substantial economic and transportation interests here. Iran,
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Uzbekistan have applied for membership to the
BSEC. Additionally, Austria, Italy, Israel, Egypt, Slovakia, Tunisia and Poland joined
the organization as observers; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Slovenia
and Croatia submitted their applications for obtaining observer status.54
The EU enlargement process and the ongoing NATO enlargement increased the
significance of the Black Sea region.55 Participation in the politics of the region via
cooperative security arrangements including the BSEC, GUUAM, and
BLACKSEAFOR is considered part of the European policy of Black Sea states. In this
sense, Black Sea regional cooperation is increasingly being seen as an integral part of
the European integration.56 The EU reiterated its intention to avoid dividing lines in
Europe and to promote stability and prosperity beyond the new borders of the Union in
                                                          
53 IREX (International Research &Exchanges Board). September 2-3 2000. “Regional Dynamics of The
Black and Caspian Sea Basin,” Conference Paper, Odessa, Ukraine, available at http://www.irex.org/
programs/odesa-conference/index.html.
54National Institute for Strategic Studies and National Institute for Ukrainian-Russian Relations. 1999.
“Ukraine 2000 and Beyond: Geopolitical Priorities and Scenarios of Development,” The monograph of the
and. Kiev, NISS, available at http://www.niss.gov.ua/book/engl/001.html.
55 The European Union. 11 December 1997. “Enlargement will Further Increase the Black Sea Regions
Significance to the EU,” Brussels: European Commission Report, IP/97/1103, available at
http://www.europa.eu.org.
56 The EastWest Institute, op. cit., p. 5.
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Copenhagen.57 The inclusion of ten new members will transform the region in Europe’s
direct neighborhood therefore the Black Sea region’s security and stability will become
vital for European security. In addition to the bilateral relations between NATO/EU/
United States and Russia, the BSEC provides a useful multilateral framework for
managing relations with Russia.58 Taken into consideration its historical traditions and
geographical position, its economic, human and natural resources and its new
geopolitical role in a changing world, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that the
Black Sea region has a promising future.
3.3. Main Players in the Region
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Greece can be named as the main regional players
in the Black Sea region, due to their relatively higher capabilities and their important
geographical locations. These countries constitute the central North-South and East-
West axes of the Black Sea region. They also constitute the dynamic core for the region.
This is not to ignore the importance of other states and their important role in
determining the center of gravity in the region.59 But, it should be noted that
understanding the perspectives of the core countries in the region has great importance
in analyzing the regional politics of a specific region.
                                                          
57The European Union. 12-13 December 2002. “Presidency Declarations of Copenhagen European
Council,” available at http://www.europa.eu.org.
58 Andrew Cottey (ed.) 1999. Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe: Building Security, Prosperity,
and Solidarity from Barents to the Black Sea. New York: St. Martins Press, p. 247.
59 The EastWest Institute, op. cit.
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Table 1: The countries of the Black Sea region: area, population, GNI per
capita60
Country Area
Sq. km.
Population
(est.2001) million
GNI Per capita
(2001) US $.
Albania 28,748 3.4 1196
Armenia 29,800 3.8 560
Azerbaijan 86,000 8.1 650
Bulgaria 110,994 8.1 1560
Georgia 70,000 5.16 620
Greece 131,957 10.6 11,780
Moldova 33,843 4.3 380
Romania 237,499 22.5 1328.8
Russia 17075,400 144.8 1750
Turkey 766,640 66.2 2540
Ukraine 233,000 49.1 720
3.3.1. Russia
Although the Russian Federation is not a superpower in the post-Cold War era,
it is one of the most influential actors in the international arena. With its great power
status, it is also one of the most important Black Sea powers and it remains the dominant
economic, political, and military force in the region.
                                                          
60 The data for Table 1 were taken from the official website of the World Bank, available at http://www.
worldbank .org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html.
29
The Black Sea constitutes a natural security zone for Russia. Russia views the
Black Sea region as its natural defense line and a vital outlet to the Mediterranean.61
Despite the fact that its coastline inherited from USSR is now approximately only 30
percent of the former and it has only three of the 20 main coastal cities and only one
advanced seaport, Novorossisk,62 the Black Sea continues to be a gateway to the world
ocean for Russia.
Relations with the countries in the Black Sea region are vital for Russian
foreign policy, due to economic, political, and security reasons. The dependence of other
countries in the region on Russia in both energy and economic sectors strengthen its
advantageous position in foreign policy making. There are many conflicts and disputes,
which should be solved without sidelining Russia, through its southern boundaries.
Many Russian regions have maintained strong economical links with the Black
Sea region. About 25 percent of Russian foreign trade is made via Black Sea routes.63
Nearly 50 percent of Russia’s foreign currency revenues are generated by oil and gas
sales and for the Putin administration, increasing Russian energy exports to Europe is a
priority.64
The presence of the large number of ethnic Russians in the Black Sea region,
the unsettled character of Russia’s southern borders, increasing secessionist movements
and ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, the military presence of the West in the region, and
Russia’s access to energy resources and routes are sources of concern for Russia. These
                                                          
61Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova. 1999. “The Emerging Security Environment in The Black Sea
Region,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 9(4): 7.
     62 Nikolai Kovalsky. 2001. “Russia and the Black Sea Realities” in Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p.163.
63Ibid., p. 164.
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issues have created a volatile security environment for Russia’s interests. Therefore
Russia wants to remain strong in the area and have influence over the CIS members in
order to ensure the security of its southern flank and politico-economic interests.65
3.3.2. Turkey
Turkey is in a very important location on the intersection of the East and West
and the North and South. It is in the vicinity of power and energy centers like Russia and
the southern Caucasus. It has a longer experience of democratization and liberal
economy compared to that of the post-communist states in the Black Sea region. Turkey
has an emerging regional economy and market. The process of integration with Europe
has continued to be the top foreign policy priority of Turkey in the post-Cold War era.
 Turkey’s geopolitical advantages for securing the energy corridor are admired
by the US and other Western countries. Turkey benefits from its favorable position and
many energy transportation projects are on the way of completion. Turkey’s initiation of
the BSEC took place because of the efforts of Turkish policy makers to integrate Turkey
into the global economy and their desire to join the European Integration process.66 The
Turkish foreign policy elite sees the BSEC as another stepping-stone in Turkey’s
progressive advance towards European integration.
Increasing its trade with the Black Sea countries, diversification of energy
supplies, reducing its energy dependence, realization of the oil and gas transportation
project, and strengthening the independence and territorial integrity of the Post-Soviet
                                                                                                                                                                          
64 Fiona Hill. 2001. “The Caucasus and Central Asia,” Brookings Policy Brief  No.80, p.4, available at
http://www.brookings.edu.
65 Timothy L. Thomas and John Shull. December 1999-February 2000. “Russian National Interests and
The Caspian Sea,” Perceptions, 4(4): 1.
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states of the region are among the foreign policy priorities of Turkey in the Black Sea
region.
3.3.3. Ukraine
Ukraine should be viewed as an important balancing power in the region.
Ukrainian foreign policy has focused on finding its place within the East-West divide
since it gained independence. Despite its self-consciousness about being a Black Sea
power, the Black Sea region is not considered the most important component for
Ukrainian foreign policy.67
The Black Sea policy of Ukraine constitutes a southeastern component of its
foreign policy. Ukraine sees the Black Sea region as part of the larger Europe. Similar to
the views of other main powers, Ukraine considers the Black Sea a focal base for trade
and energy transportation between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Western Europe.
After the formation of the GUUAM, it has started to follow more active policy in the
region. It’s important for Ukraine to strengthen its strategic position in the Black Sea
region. Unlike the East and the West vector, the Black Sea option does not demand that
Ukraine make a choice between them. Currently Ukraine cooperates with both the East
and the West.68 The settling of conflicts is of vital importance for Ukraine as well as
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cit.
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relations of equal partnership with Poland, Turkey, Russia and other powerful regional
leaders.69
The election of allegedly “pro-Russian” Leonid Kuchma in July 1994 did not
radically change the strategic direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy. The membership of
the EU has been proclaimed as a strategic objective by the Ukrainian
leadership.70Although Ukrainian membership in the EU would be less provocative to
Russia and do more in addressing its socio-economic problems it seems more
problematical and less attainable in the near future than NATO membership.71Under
Kuchma, Ukraine has adopted a balanced foreign policy between CIS and the West.
Cooperation within the CIS structure has remained purely within the realm of economic
issues. Ukraine remains a self-declared neutral, non-bloc status.72 Two leading domestic
factors that prevent Ukraine’s integration into NATO and EU structures are the close
economic ties and energy dependency upon Russia, and the disunity with regional
loyalties and low national consciousness in eastern and southern Ukraine.73 In addition
to Ukraine’s close relationship with the West, 90 percent of Russian oil and most of its
gas is exported to Western and Central Europe via pipelines through Ukrainian territory,
this gives Ukraine a certain leverage in its dealings with Russia.74Due to various new
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projects such as the Yamal pipeline75 Ukraine is likely to start losing its advantageous
position with the transport of Russian gas to Central and Western Europe.
The transportation of Caspian energy, building of new transit routes, and
preserving the territorial integrity are among the main interests of all GUUAM states
involving Ukraine. Ukraine has important significant energy transportation interests in
the Caucasus and it plays a serious role in the strengthening of regional cooperation and
in the intensification of integrative processes. For Ukraine, importing some 85 percent of
its energy requirements mainly from Russia, it is vital to diversify its energy supplies.76
The activation of the new transport communication system (TRACECA project)77 is
very important to Ukrainian interests, because Ukraine will become a significant
communication link between Europe and Asia. This project also aims to enhance
economic and political independence of the republics in the region.78
 Ukraine’s foreign policy activity is limited by the necessity to balance between
the interests of Russia and the West. On the one hand, Ukraine follows multifaceted
integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, social, and security structures. On
the other hand, it supports the development of equal and mutually beneficial economic,
political, and socio-cultural relations with Russia. Unlike the East-West vector of its
foreign policy, the Black Sea vector does not create problems but presents opportunities
for mutually beneficial trade and implementation of large-scale economic projects.
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3.3.4. Greece
Although Greece has no borders on the Black Sea, it is a Black Sea country due
to cultural, economic, historical and political reasons. It is among the most important
members in the BSEC structure. Counterbalancing Turkey’s political influence in the
Black Sea area was the intention of the Greek government, especially in the first half of
the 1990s. It was replaced by more pragmatic policies prioritizing trade and investment
after 1996.79 Greece with its relatively strong economic structure and balanced
macroeconomic base is an important Balkan and Black Sea country.
Moreover, it is the only full EU member in the region. With its EU membership
status, it plays a central role in the regional cooperation process. Greece is in a position
to provide EU financial resources for regional projects. Its affinity with the Orthodox
nations of the region might be perceived as another cultural asset of Greece for the
region.
3.4. Main Regional Security Challenges and Sources of Conflicts
The end of the cold war increased the regional security issues in the Black Sea
region and opened the “Pandora’s Box”. Old regional disputes have been reinvigorated
and new regional security agendas have emerged. Due to the unsettled character of
regional relations, internal weaknesses of post-communist states, and their susceptibility
to outside pressures have created a problematical security structure in the region,
especially in the Caucasus. Conflicts in Chechnya and Karabakh, Abkhazia-Georgia and
Ossetia-Georgia, Transdniestr and Ingushetia-North Ossetia constitute the most
important ones. Additionally, disputes between Greece and Turkey, Russia and Ukraine
affected cooperative relations badly. These developments have prioritized military
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dimensions of security. Despite the fact that there have been many issues concerning the
political, economical, societal and ecological dimensions of security, these have stayed
under the shadow of military security.
It is clear that there is more instability in the Black Sea region than in the West.
People living in the region have felt the negative effects of conflicts. The conflicts
hinder economic prosperity in the Caucasus. Because of the conflicts, oil transportation
from the East to the West has been delayed to some extent and affected the process of
planning alternative oil and gas transportation routes. Uncontrolled proliferation and
illicit trafficking of small arms undermines development in the South Caucasus.80 The
problem of refugees and forced migrants as a result of conflict, political and economic
malaise are clearly of particular concern. Conflicts resulted in many hundred thousand
internally displaced persons from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Chechnya, North Ossetia and Transdniestr.81
In addition to the above mentioned problems, which are increasingly
detrimental to the interests of the Black Sea littoral states and even beyond, the sea and
the coasts are becoming one of the most polluted areas in the world.82 Intensified oil
shipments and increasing oil terminals cause contamination of the sea and affect the
fishing and tourism industry adversely.83
                                                                                                                                                                          
79 Tunç Aybak, opç cit., p. 52.
80Forum on Early Warning and Early Response. 28 Feb 2002. “Conflict Prevention in the Caucasus:
Actors, response capacities and planning processes,” available at http://www.reliefweb.int/w/
rwb.nsf/0/1e916089974ee158c1256b97002d6f76?OpenDocument
81UNHCR. 1999. “Operations in Russian Federation,” available at http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/ga99/rus.ht.
82 Vladimir Aleksandrov. 1997. “Ecological Problems of the Black Sea,” International Affairs (Moscow),
43(2): 87.
83 Colin Woodward. 7 March 1997. “Reviving the Black Sea,” Transition, 3(4): 50.
36
3.4.1. Greek-Turkish issues
Especially after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan and the earthquakes in the two
countries, Greek policies towards Turkey have changed drastically. Greece approved the
candidacy of Turkey for being a full member in the EU at the Helsinki Summit in late
1999. Today, the two governments seem to adopt a neo-functionalist approach. They are
dealing with low-politics rather than high politics by implementing some confidence
building measures.
Although there is rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, there are too
many unresolved bilateral disputes between the two countries. The Cyprus issue,
territorial waters, continental shelf, airspace and FIR, demilitarization of the Aegean
Islands, undetermined sovereignty of islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean Sea,
command and control problems concerning NATO in the Aegean Sea, and minorities in
Western Thrace and Istanbul are some of the many issues.
Greece wants to submit only the continental shelf dispute to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). Turkey wants to solve all Aegean related disputes via bilateral
negotiations. However, Ankara, in principle is not against bringing all the Aegean
disputes together to the ICJ. Furthermore, the Cyprus dispute in an important factor that
affects Greek-Turkish relations negatively. Time will show whether the rapprochement
between the two countries will lead to solutions of disputes by peaceful means.
3.4.2. Ukrainian-Russian tensions
There have been potential areas of disagreement between Russia and Ukraine
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow and Kiev have been at odds over a wide
range of issues. The ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian status over Crimea,
in particular the city of Sevastopol, has been among the most problematic issues.
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Additionally, the delineation of the Black Sea and the Azov continental shelves,
international debt repayments, energy deliveries, and the shape of CIS have constituted
other disputes between Ukraine and Russia.
When Ukraine declared that all military hardware on its territory belonged to
Ukraine in 1991, debates over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet caused tension
between Russia and Ukraine. The conflict was finally settled in May 1997, at least for
twenty years the two parties agreed on the division of the fleet between them. A series of
conciliatory steps taken by both sides in April of 1997 have pushed the impetus in favor
of making a final deal. Ukraine agreed to have its navy participate in joint operational-
strategic exercises with the Russian Black Sea Fleet.  Yeltsin’s government simply
ignored Duma’s appeal demanding "special territorial status" for Sevastopol.84The
agreement was approved by both countries’ parliament in 1998 and early 1999.
Crimea was the territory of Russia until 1954, when Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev bequeathed it to Ukraine as a sign of friendship.  Now, Crimea is part of an
independent Ukraine with the status of an autonomous republic and of its population
about 70 percent is Russian and 25 percent is Ukrainian.85 Crimea is one of the most
fortified harbors in the world and has served for more than two centuries as a main base
of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.86 Ethnic tensions were prompted in 1992 when some
advocated for the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and its annexation to Russia. In July
1992, the Crimean and Ukrainian parliaments determined that Crimea would remain
under Ukrainian jurisdiction while retaining significant cultural and economic
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autonomy.87 Again Ukrainian authorities were faced with serious ethnically based unrest
because of the separatist attempts of pro-Russian forces in 1994 and 1995.88 Between the
years of 1994-1997, various forms of provocative statements came not only from
separatist pro-Russian forces in Crimea and extremist Russian politicians, but also from
the Russian State Duma.89Following the Black Sea Fleet Treaty, the Major Treaty
between Ukraine and Russia solved the question of Ukrainian territorial integrity on
paper. Russia fully recognizes Ukrainian territorial integrity including Crimea and
Sevastopol in this treaty. Additionally, the Crimean constitution satisfying both
Ukrainians and the local Crimean parliaments was adopted in 1998. Ethnic tensions
seem to be pacified in the region, at least for now.
Today it seems that both the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea issues are settled. In
November 2000, Russia and Ukraine have managed to complete negotiations on land-
border delimitation, while their differences on the maritime borders in the Azov Sea and
the Strait of Kerch have been on the table and are no longer conflict prone.90 Both
countries have an opportunity to ease their remaining tensions and fully normalize their
relations.91
3.4.3. Transdniestr conflict
As a result of Moscow’s instigation and active support, the Transdniestr region
declared its secession from Moldova in September 1991. In late summer 1992, a
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negotiated cease-fire agreement enshrining the status quo in Transdniestr was signed.
While not recognized by any other country, the region has been experiencing a de facto
sovereign state. As long as the conflict is not settled, Moldavian authorities cannot
regain control over the territory92. 100.000 displaced persons fled from the region. About
80 percent of them were Moldavians, 8 percent Russians, and 7 percent Ukrainians.93
Russia pledged to withdraw its 2,500 troops, 50,000 weapons, and 40,000 tons
of ammunition from Transdniestr by the end of 1999 in an OSCE Summit in Istanbul94,
but Russia is way behind the schedule in destroying and removing the arms and
munitions from Transdniestr. The objectives of the Russian military in Moldova have
been as follows: preventing the reunification of Moldova with Romania; keeping
Moldova within the Russian sphere of influence; maintaining Russia’s military
infrastructure in Moldova’s Transdniestr region.95
According to a draft plan, endorsed jointly by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, and Ukraine in 2002, Moldova is supposed to
turn into a federal state. The measure is apparently meant to settle a decade-long dispute
between Moldova and its breakaway Transdniestr region. Under the plan, Transdniestr
would have the right to its own constitution and to an equal number of deputies as
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Moldova in one of the chambers of the future parliament. But the plan has come under
severe criticism from Moldova's opposition parties.96
3.4.4. Georgia-South Ossetia conflict
Following the ethnic tensions and the abolition of the autonomous status of
South Ossetia by Georgia in December 1990, conflicts began between Georgian forces
and the Ossetian separatist in the spring of 1992. Ossetians demanded the unification of
North and South Ossetia under the umbrella of the Russian Federation. Following
negotiations between Georgian President Shevardnadze and Russian president Yeltsin, a
cease-fire agreement was signed in June 1992, and a joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian
peacekeeping force was deployed to the region. About 1000 people from each side were
killed, and nearly 11.000 Georgians and 10.000 South Ossetians fled the region.97 The
situation remains unresolved and no solution has been reached in this conflict.
3.4.5. Georgia-Abkhazia conflict
In July 1992, Abkhazian separatists declared their independence from Georgia.
This led to a war between the Abkhazian and Georgian government forces. Russia’s role
as mediator gave them opportunity to expand their influence over Georgia. After a
violated first agreement between the separatists, Georgia and Russia, all three parties
signed a second cease-fire on July 17th 1993. On May 14th 1994, Georgian and
Abkhazian parties signed an agreement on the deployment of CIS peacekeeping forces
in the region.98An estimated 250,000 Georgians have been displaced from their homes
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since the conflict with Abkhazia erupted 10 years ago99In Abkhazia, the total population
of Armenians and Russians is much more than Abkhazians and they are also more
influential.100
The peace talks with UN efforts continue. Since 1994 the Abkhaz have
maintained that they will negotiate with Georgia only on creating a confederation in
which Abkhazia and Georgia would be equal partners. Tbilisi, however, has consistently
rejected that option, saying that it is prepared to offer Abkhazia only "the broadest
conceivable autonomy" within a unitary Georgian state.101The plan of Boden, who is UN
secretary-general Kofi Annan's special envoy for the Abkhaz conflict, proposes the
division of constitutional powers within a sovereign Georgian state between the central
Georgian government and that of the breakaway Republic of Abkhazia. But there are
two obstacles for a final political settlement of the deadlocked conflict. First, Abkhaz
leaders have rejected any talks on the UN document as irrelevant, arguing that Abkhazia
is already de facto and de jure an independent state. And second, Georgia is demanding
the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping force, 102restoration of Georgia’s
jurisdiction and the security of' returning refugees.103 Since 1997, Georgia has been
negotiating with Russia over the withdrawal of Russian border guards from Abkhazia.104
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Georgia has insisted Russia hand back the remaining two bases -- Akhalkaladi and
Batumi -- within three years. But Russia has demanded 11 years for the hand-over.105
3.4.6. Chechen-Russian conflict
Two wars have taken place between Chechens and the Russian federal forces,
since the demise of the Soviet Union. The first war erupted in December 1994, when
Russia intervened in the armed conflict between forces supporting elected President
General Dudayev and his fundamentalist opponents. The Khasavjurt Agreement, which
was signed in August 1996, ended the first Chechen war. According to the Russian-
Chechen treaty, signed in Moscow on May 12th 1997, final status of the Republic was
postponed for five years and Russian troops were withdrawn.106
The second war broke out in the summer of 1999 when Chechen forces, under
the leadership of Basajev, entered Dagestan and proclaimed an Islamic Republic. Russia
intervened firstly with a bombing and then deployed ground forces. Russian forces
managed to expel Chechen forces from Dagestan and from most of the territory in
Chechnya. Conflicts still arise between some separatist elements and Russian forces
today.
3.4.7. North Ossetia-Ingushetia conflict
Disagreement between Ingushetia and North Ossetia over the disputed
Prigorodniy rayon, situated between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, led to conflict in
1992. Prigorodniy was an urban center and a vital piece of real estate for North Ossetia
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and Ingushetia. 107 When large-scale violence erupted at the end of October in several
parts of the Prigorodniy, Russia intervened with its paratroopers and MVD forces. A
state of emergency remained until February 1995 but no solution has been reached,
including a solution to the problem of the return of refugees. About 60.000 Ingush were
displaced as a result of clashes in late 1992.108 The Ossetian government considers the
perpetuation of the status quo favorable and imposes strict conditions for the return of
refugees.
3.4.8. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
The twelve-year conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh is among the most complex in the region. It is the first and the longest-running
conflict occurring in the territory of the former Soviet Union. With Gorbachev’s policy
of glasnost and perestroika, ethnic tensions came back to surface in Nagorno-Karabakh,
a mountainous enclave of approximately forty four hundred square kilometers situated in
the former Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Rather than mentioning early historical
developments, it should be stated that Josef Stalin placed this area in the territory of
Soviet Azerbaijan as an Autonomous Oblast in the 1920s.109 In 1988, Karabakh
Armenians voted to break from Azerbaijan. Although article 70 of the USSR
constitution gave the right of self-determination to the people of the Soviet Union,
Article 78 indicated that borders between Union republics be changed only with the
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consent of both republics involved.110 This triggered the violent conflicts that reached
the level of full-scale war.
After the independence of Azerbaijan on 30 August 1991 and of Armenia on 23
September 1991, the issue transformed from a domestic problem into an international
political dispute. The provincial authorities adopted a declaration proclaiming the
independence of the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” on 2 September 1991.
This was confirmed by a referendum on 10 December 1991. 111 This situation paved the
way for mediation attempts by various countries and international organizations.112 The
OSCE’s Minsk group consisting of the delegates from the US, Russia, France, Germany,
Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Belarus, Turkey as well as Armenia
and Azerbaijan has taken an active role in the peace process. The war ended with a
cease-fire in 1994. The war between 1992 and 1994 left 30.000 dead and 800.000
refugees.113 Since May 1994 both sides have not violated it. At the end of the war the
Armenians managed to take control of seven Azerbaijani provinces, including Shushi
and Lachin, and use them as a buffer zone.
This Nagorno-Karabakh conflict constitutes one of the factors deteriorating the
relations between Turkey and Armenia. Apart from this conflict, the Armenian
government did not acknowledge its borders with Turkey, thus keeping in reserve
potential territorial claims on Northeastern Turkey. The problem of the so-called 1915
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genocide is also an obstacle in Turkish-Armenian relations. At the beginning of the
1990s, Turkey adopted a neutral policy, which enabled it to depict itself as a fair
mediator between the two countries.114 After the Armenians’ massacre on Azerbaijani
civilians in the Karabakh town of Khojali in late February 1992, Turkey followed a more
pro-Azerbaijani attitude.115 Taking into account, Azerbaijan’s deteriorating situation,
Ankara has tried to explain and promote the Azeri view of the conflict in the
international fore. Turkish diplomats played an active role in the OSCE -Minsk Group-
seeking to settle the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Today, Turkey supports UN Security Council resolutions and the OSCE/Minsk
Peace Process. As Azerbaijan’s strongest ally, Turkey claims that relations will not
return to normal conditions unless the Armenian government sincerely relinquishes
territorial demands on Turkey’s provinces. Armenia should also use its influence and
force the Karabakh Armenians to depart from the territories occupied in Azerbaijan
beyond the debatable enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.116 The Turkish-Armenian border
remains closed today. The Armenians intensify their propaganda of the so-called 1915
Armenian-genocide allegations to exclude Turkey from the international arena and make
Turkey impartial in the events of the Caucasus.117 The Armenian government puts
Turkish recognition of the 1915 Genocide as a precondition to relations. Within this
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context, it should be noted that positions of both sides on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are
the main reason for the stalemate in relations between Armenia and Turkey. But, other
above-mentioned problematic issues between the two countries are among the factors
preventing good neighborly relations.
Regarding the current positions of both sides, Armenia has consistently desired
the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an equal participant in the conflict and in the
peace talks. It seems ready to exchange the Azeri territories they presently occupy for
the international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent republic. Today no
country, including Armenia, recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent republic.
Armenia also wants guaranteed unrestricted contact with Nagorno-Karabakh through
Azeri territory. Armenia places the Nagorno-Karabakh issue first.
Azerbaijan reclaims its territorial integrity, and proposes the returning of its
refugees to their former homes and granting the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians broad
autonomy within the confines of the republic. Azerbaijan considers Armenia, not
Nagorno-Karabakh, to be the opposing side in the conflict and opposes any dialogue
with Nagorno-Karabakh before the Armenia’s aggression is dealt with. Azerbaijan
insists on not defining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh before the recovery of the
occupied territory.118
Minsk Group Aliyev and Kocharian parties came close to a peace plan during
the last talks held in 2002. Reuters reported, without giving a source that Nagorno-
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Karabakh would have "a high degree of self-government" while remaining nominally
part of Azerbaijan, and that Armenian forces would withdraw from the occupied
territory adjacent to the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic but retain control of
the Lachin corridor linking the enclave with Armenia. Armenia would also guarantee
free communication across its territory between Azerbaijan and its enclave of
Nakhichevan.119 Due to the domestic and political opposition in both countries, neither
side approved these statements. The leaders of both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
have also come out with maximizing statements in recent months.120
The situation in the Caucasus and Transdniestr might be defined with the terms
“no peace, no war”. 121 In all cases, most of the violence has been ended by cease-fires,
but settlement of legal status remains unsolved. While national governments continue to
insist on their territorial integrity, secessionists claim their right to national self-
determination. In the long run, regional or subregional economic and political structures
might play a more influential role in overcoming these contradictions and preventing the
spread of conflicts by creating a general platform for collaboration in the sphere of
security with the maximum account for interests of all states of the region.
 Today, one can easily be said that the Black Sea area is certainly more of a
region than it was in early 1990s. This region comprises an eleven-member country
subsystem connecting the European Union to Southeastern Europe, the Trans-Caucasus
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NIS and the former Soviet Union.122 It has a growing significance in the post-Cold War
era due to the early mentioned reasons. But, it should be noted that the Black Sea region
is a region in the process of being built. The process has not been completely finished.
All the Black Sea states and their people are well aware of the fact that
economic recovery, peace and stability in the region are their common interests. They
should also see regional cooperation as the most promising strategy for obtaining these
goals. In this context, transformation of the conflicts of interests in the region into the
cooperative efforts of the interested parties might allow all countries to enjoy long
lasting peace, prosperity and sustainable growth within the region. The core countries
need to be engaged in the search for solutions together with the US and relevant IGOs
and NGOs.
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CHAPTER 4
REGIONAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY INITIATIVES IN THE
BLACK SEA REGION
Since the Black Sea region is located in the trade and geopolitical crossroads of
Europe and Asia, it has been a place where people of various nationalities, traditions,
cultures and religions have lived together and intermingled since ancient times.
Although the efforts to build bridges, enhance mutually beneficial trade relations, and
contribute to the rapprochement among neighboring nations have been made for
centuries, for many decades after the Second World War, the political atmosphere in the
region was characterized by mutual mistrust and suspicion between the countries divided
by the East-West confrontation. With the end of the Cold War, the countries of the
region have won a new chance to revive their cooperative spirit.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, new regional initiatives have been taken in
the region. The BSEC, the GUUAM and BLACKSEAFOR are among the most
important and most efficient cooperative regional arrangements. From a wider
perspective, these initiatives can be perceived as elements contributing to peace and
stability not only in the region, but also in the whole European continent.
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In addition to the larger European security organizations such as the EU, NATO
and the OSCE, the regional initiatives in the Black Sea region provide frameworks for
cooperation among states and peoples of the region in a wide variety of subtle and
complex ways.123 Among them, the BSEC and the GUUAM may be considered as
economically based arrangements and CSBMs. The BLACKSEAFOR may be classified
as a mainly military arrangement. All of them, however, involve political, economic,
social, and environmental dimensions.
4.1. Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
The BSEC is the most important cooperative arrangement in the region, since it
is the largest and basically the only comprehensive regional economic organization of
the Black Sea region.124 It also represents a potentially useful vehicle for regional
integration.125 At the same time, the BSEC is the most longstanding and highly
institutionalized region-building project in the southeast.126 The BSEC, as opposed to
other regional initiatives developing under the supervision of the EU or US, is a self-
made grouping.127
The BSEC has opened a new and special chapter in Black Sea regional history.
It was established at a time when the Balkans and the Caucasus were facing great unrest
and difficulties, coupled with ethnic conflicts. The BSEC has proved itself to be a forum
where the participating states put aside their differences to undertake joint economic
projects for their mutual benefit. It proved to be a regional arrangement where economic
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motives transcended political conflicts.128 Since 1992, the BSEC has made substantial
progress. It established the Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS),
Parliamentary Assembly (PABSEC) and Business Council. In 1999, BSEC transformed
itself into a regional economic organization and established its own financial institution,
the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB). The importance of this
organization might be covered by examining its roots and characteristics as well as its
efficiency.
4.1.1. Historical overview
The attempt to create a regional cooperation organization among the Black Sea
countries came at a time of momentous change. There appeared to be a growing need for
greater cooperation, collaboration and joint achievements.129 The formation of a regional
organization for economic cooperation among countries around the Black Sea had been
suggested to President Turgut Özal first by Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ, former head of
the Turkish mission in Washington, DC.130 The former USSR, some republics of the
former USSR (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), Bulgaria and
Romania expressed their support for the project. Thus, Turkey pursuing the leadership
role, initiated the process. The representatives of these countries were brought together
in December 1990 in Ankara.131 At the end of the meeting, they officially declared that
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they agreed to form a Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone together with Turkey. A
decision was reached to prepare a document containing the essential principles guiding
economic cooperation in the region. In this context, Turkey was entrusted with the duty
of preparing a draft document following a meeting at the technical level in Bucharest on
March 12th-13th 1991. Later the Work Group met in Sofia on April 23rd-25th 1991 and in
Moscow on July 11th-12th 1991. They drafted a document determining the framework for
regional cooperation. Following these three rounds of talks, with Ukraine joining later,
the Foreign Ministers got together in February 1992 in Istanbul and agreed to sign the
declaration, consisting of 18 Articles, establishing the BSEC. Following the approval of
the application for membership of Greece and Albania, the BSEC Summit Declaration
was signed on June 25th, 1992 in Istanbul by the Presidents or Prime Ministers of 11
states.132 With the signing of the Summit Declaration, the BSEC was founded as a
regional structure for multilateral cooperation. Thus, the formative stage, the period
from the emergence of the BSEC on June 25th 1992 to the establishment of PERMIS on
March 10th 1994, had begun.
In the consolidation period, two major steps were taken: the Bucharest
Statement from high-level meetings of the heads of state or government (June 30th 1995)
and the Moscow Declaration (October 25th 1996). These were milestones in shaping the
BSEC. The Bucharest Statement formulated the parameters for priority areas of
cooperation. It gave prominence to the private sector and extended the areas of
cooperation to cover the combating of organized crime, the illicit trafficking of drugs
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and weapons and all acts of terrorism and illegal border crossings. The Moscow
Declaration officially provided a vision for the transformation of the BSEC region into a
free trade area.133
The Yalta Summit, on June 5th 1998, concluded the BSEC Charter. Following
the ratification formalities, the Charter came into force marking the official inauguration
of the organization of the BSEC on May 1st 1999.134 By this act, the BSEC pledged the
enduring commitment of its eleven signatories, emerged as a regional economic
organization, acquired a new status with legal identity on the international arena, and
adopted a legally binding charter replacing the political declaration of Istanbul as its
principal instrument. With the Istanbul Summit declaration, of November 17th, 1999 the
BSEC ushered in a result-oriented programs and projects stage.135 Today the
organizational structure, which was established by the founding Charter, operates as in
previous years in the intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary, inter-business, financial
and academic levels.
4.1.2. Main characteristics of the BSEC
The BSEC is set to contribute to regional and consequently global peace
through economic cooperation and prosperity. The security function of the BSEC is
based on the formula that economic cooperation is the most effective CBM. Regional
cooperation promotes security and stability through closer economic ties and greater
interdependence. Thus, economic cooperation acts as a catalyst for security. In the
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summit declaration of 1992, the participating heads of state and government confirmed
their intention to develop economic cooperation as a contribution to the CSCE process,
and to the establishment of a Europe-wide economic area as well as to the achievement
of a higher degree of integration of the participating states within the world economy.136
The BSEC was developed as a framework for regional cooperation with various
aspects.  Following the summit declaration of the BSEC, signed on June 25th 1992 in
Istanbul, the principles and the objectives of cooperation have been stated in several
founding documents; The Bosphorus Statement of June 25 1992, The Bucharest
Statement of the High Level Meeting of the BSEC Participating states of June 30th
1995, the Moscow Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Participating
States of the BSEC of October 25th 1996, and the Yalta Summit Declaration of 5 June
1998 137 and finally, the Charter of the Organization of the BSEC, which will transform
the BSEC into a fully-fledged regional economic organization signed during the Yalta
Summit. In all the above-mentioned documents, the main purpose of the BSEC was
defined as the promotion of ‘comprehensive multilateral and bilateral’ economic
cooperation and, on this basis, the consolidation of peace and stability in the Black Sea
Region.
The BSEC is a highly institutionalized organization. It has been
institutionalized in line with the Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS),
PABSEC, the Business Council of the BSEC, BSTDB and the Coordination Center for
Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information. The Meeting of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs (MMFA) is the main decision making body of the BSEC. Foreign
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Ministers of the BSEC meet at least twice a year, preceded by meetings of senior
officials.  In addition to this, day-to-day work is undertaken by working groups. A total
of eighteen working groups from transportation to energy develop regional projects. The
PABSEC meets twice a year. The advisory status of the PABSEC, through its permanent
committees, also contributes legal-institutional developments within the BSEC structure.
The BSEC Business Council represents the business communities of these 11 countries
and was launched a few months after the intergovernmental BSEC initiative. The
Business Council is an international non-governmental organization designed to promote
cooperation among the business communities of the 11 countries and is one of the
related bodies of the organization of the BSEC. The BSEC operates on five different
platforms involving intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary, inter-business, banking and
finance, and academics.
The BSEC represents the strong political will of the member states to establish
and maintain dialogue and cooperation at different levels and dimensions including
governments, parliaments, the private sector, local administrations, NGOs, and
academicians. Having started as a “top-down” approach”, it is gradually turning into a “
bottom-up approach”.138
The BSEC acts on a wide spectrum of cooperation. The Charter foresees
priority areas as trade and economic development, banking and finance,
communications, energy, transport, agriculture and agro-industry, health care and
pharmaceuticals, environmental protection, tourism, science and technology, exchange
of statistical data and economic information, collaboration between customs and other
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border authorities, human contacts, combating organized crime, illicit trafficking of
drugs, weapons and radioactive materials, all acts of terrorism and illegal migration.
It should be stressed that the BSEC is not a traditional regional security
organization. It facilitates the creation of an external regional environment in which the
smooth transition to democracy and market economy can be fostered. In the long run, it
is expected to contribute to further regional cooperation.139
While the CBSS and the BEAC have developed further in the post-Cold War
regional/subregional groups, the BSEC has developed relatively slowly. The main
reason lies in that they have received political, economic and technical support from the
wealthy Nordic states.140 The EU and NATO have also actively supported these
initiatives. The CBSS, the BEAC, and the BSEC have diverse memberships and similar
objectives. On the one hand, Russian membership in these three organizations provides
Western countries with the chance of deepening cooperative ties with Russia. On the
other, it makes them more likely to have a more permanent role to play141 since Russia
and other countries appear unlikely to join Euro-Atlantic Structures.
When examined, the structure and development process of the BSEC unveils
itself as mainly a soft security power. Military security is not listed on the agenda and it
concentrates on economic, social and cultural cooperation. It acts in conformity with the
principles of the cooperative security concept. It continues to be the most important
cooperative security arrangement in the region, because it is the largest, most
                                                          
139 Tunç Aybak. 2001. “Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Turkey: Extending European Integration to
the East?” in Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p. 56.
140 Andrew Cottey, op cit., p. 246.
141 Ibid., p. 246.
57
longstanding, highly institutionalized and basically the only comprehensive regional
economic organization of the Black Sea region.
4.1.3. Efficiency of the BSEC
Analysts make diverse evaluations about the efficiency of the BSEC, so the
assessment of the BSEC’s performance gives mixed results. It is possible to examine the
issue from both a pessimistic and an optimistic point of view. When pessimism is
adopted, its implications may become causes for adopting a more optimistic approach
about what it has accomplished so far. Although there are some negative factors in
BSEC’s credibility, in general, there are many reasons for looking through the lens of
optimism.
As far as a pessimistic view is concerned, one can easily find a discrepancy
between the proclaimed objectives and the degree of implementation of numerous
projects adopted under the BSEC aegis. Despite its declared intentions and the progress
in preparing several very promising projects, the BSEC has so far failed to achieve many
of its practical goals and little substantial cooperation has been established. Before its
organizational status, the BSEC’s activities were limited to discussions and usually no
binding documents were signed. The BSEC still lacks a clear priority or unifying core
for its activities. The development of regional trade remains embryonic. Moreover,
bilateral trade relations between most of the BSEC members are underdeveloped. Very
often the main trading partners of BSEC members are outside powers. The BSEC has
played no direct role in managing or resolving the serious conflicts among its members
(Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Ukraine, and Greece and Turkey, and in Georgia
and Moldova), nor does it seem likely to.
58
Today the BSEC is the most diverse among the other regional groups in the
Barents-Black Sea belt. The relative poverty of the BSEC members means that they
have few resources to support cooperation. The BSEC’s relation with potential external
fund providers of the project, particularly the EU and the EBRD (European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development), are less developed than those of the CBSS, the
BEAC and the CEI, although such ties are now expanding. 142 Other groups in the
Barents-Black Sea either have strong Western involvement as in the BEAC, the CBSS
and the CEI, or are much smaller in size and hence more coherent as the Central
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).143 The diversity of EU ties with the BSEC
members (EU member Greece, Associates Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the former
Soviet states which have partnership and cooperation agreements with the EU)
complicate EU financial support for BSEC activities. Most observers, however, suggest
that if the BSEC is to develop further it must define practical cooperation projects (in
areas such as economics, environment and infrastructure) and gain external financial
support for these projects from organizations such as the EBRD, the EU and the World
Bank.144
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, from a political point of view, the
BSEC’s existence for more than eleven years can already be assessed as a moderate
success. One should not forget the opinion that the BSEC process as a whole is in its
infancy. As it was appreciated at the Tbilisi International Round Table “The Black Sea is
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not yet a region in being. It is a region in making.”145 Its transformation into a regional
economic organization with a legal identity on the international scene is the most
convincing argument in this respect.146 Given the past and present differences, tensions,
and sometimes even armed conflicts, between some of its members the Group’s
existence indicates that the Black Sea states wish to pursue cooperation with one
another.
 When the BSEC was established, the regional countries gradually came to
realize that the BSEC could be utilized as a framework for cooperation within which
regional interdependence could be managed.147 It is perceived as an instrument for the
development and diversification of existing economic relations among the countries
around the Black Sea, by making efficient use of the advantages arising from their
geographical proximity, traditional ties, the complementary nature of their economies
and the large economic space and market. Towards the end of the 1990s the
regionalization of the Black Sea increased in salient regional issues such as energy and
trade. The other countries' attitude towards the BSEC has changed accordingly.
Although the BSEC has been limited by the diversity of its members and its lack of
resources, it has made a positive contribution to cooperative security in the Black Sea
region. It has provided a neutral context in which all Black Sea states could meet. For
NIS countries, the BSEC provided a platform outside Russia’s influence and hegemony.
The BSEC enables these countries to have an equal voice with Russia. Its functionalist
style and piecemeal approach to regional issues, in the long run, may generate a regional
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sense of common interest and an establishment of regional economic infrastructure may
create incentives for further regional economic cooperation. 148 The recognition of the
BSEC by the EU as a complementary cooperative framework to European integration
has also reinforced its status and legitimacy in other countries’ quest to join Europe.149
In this sense, the BSEC provides a safeguard in the enlargement of the EU to the Black
Sea region.150
The BSEC, during the 11 years since its inception, has asserted itself to be an
important CSBM and, as such, an essential element of peace and stability in the region.
The varying national interests, differing political assessments and diverse stages of
development of the participating states have not prevented them from seeking common
solutions to their problems through dialogue, economic cooperation, or creating an
environment conducive to regional stability.151 The BSEC contributes to regional
stability and security by promoting dialogue, diplomacy, development and democracy. It
is mainly a soft security provider. It aims to allay tensions between the participating
states by providing opportunities for cooperation and creating a mutually beneficial
economic equilibrium. The initiation and the following institutionalization of the BSEC
have been important achievements. In fact, with the recent ratification of its Charter in
the national parliaments of Black Sea countries, it has completed its formative phase and
consolidated its legal status as a proper regional organization.152 This has recently
transformed the political initiative of the Istanbul Summit into its new phase with legally
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binding obligations for member states.153  The BSEC has succeeded in setting up an
organizational structure, contributing to better mutual understanding and establishing
itself in the international arena.154 It’s evident that the BSEC has contributed to the
fostering a growing awareness by member states of their regional identity and perhaps
the development of a synergy among the eleven Member states. The development of the
BSEC into a prestigious regional economic organization occupying an important place
in the new European architecture is a fact today.155 At present, despite the political odds
against it, cooperation in the Black Sea region is not only a promising possibility, but
also a convincing reality.156
Although not formally under BSEC auspices, the Black Sea littoral states
(Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) signed an Agreement on the
establishment of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group, known as
BLACKSEAFOR, in April 2001. Additionally, the final document on CSBMs with
regard to naval activities in the Black Sea was signed on April 25th 2002 by six Black
Sea states and will come into force on January 1st 2003 when the preparations for
implementation are complete. The contributing role of the BSEC is regards to these
developments should not be ignored. Since 1992, the BSEC has provided for
institutionalization and intensification of relations between countries in the region,
offering a forum for multilateral regional dialogue in the post-Cold War era.
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The BSEC has contributed to the stability of the region through dialogue and
contacts, bringing countries and their governments, parliaments, private sectors, local
administrations, NGOs, academic institutions and academicians as well as their peoples
closer together, promoting interaction at every level.157The BSEC summit meetings and
working groups also provide a forum for states with outstanding disputes to discuss
matters of concern away from the glare of international attention that formal negotiation
or other public meetings would attract. It continues to play this role even today,
particularly given the fact that some states in the region do not have diplomatic relations
with each other.158   That Turkey and Greece, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Ukraine and
Russia even come to the same table to discuss serious regional issues, without being
pressured to do so by the US or the EU, is itself a considerable accomplishment. Several
countries have already recognized the BSEC’s potential and in the near future the
organization may even expand to include Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Iran and Uzbekistan,
all of which have applied for full membership.159
The BSEC has come closer to becoming a project-oriented endeavor. It has
shown more vitality and imagination than expected at the beginning, with a number of
institutional and project ramifications.160 In this regard, the emerging consensus on
cooperation in banking and in countering soft-security threats (combating organized
crime and terrorism, collaboration in emergency situations) is especially relevant. The
BSEC also proved to be an especially effective organization in environmental matters.
                                                          
157 Ibid.
158 The EastWest Institute, op. cit.
159 Charles King, op. cit., p. 60.
160 Y. Vasilianakos and S. Karaganov. 1998. “The Creation and Evolution of the BSEC. An Assessment,”
The Southeast European Yearbook 1997-1998, ELIAMEP, Athens, p. 244.
63
The coastal states signed the Bucharest Convention for the protection of the Black Sea
against Pollution with three protocols in 1992, then later the Odessa Deceleration on the
Protection of the Black Sea, these clearly enhance the desire to establish explicit
environmental goals and a time-frame that concentrates national, regional and
international resources in the most effective means. The protection of the environment is
a special area of cooperation. The first BSEC conference on environmental protection
and development was held in Tbilisi in 1994. By 1997, work had also begun on a draft
of the Black Sea Action Plan to be adopted by all the BSEC members.161 Two
significant international agreements, the “Memorandum of Understanding on
Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the BSEC Region”, and the “Additional
Protocol to the Agreement Among the Governments of the BSEC Participating States on
Cooperation in Combating Crime, in Particular in its Organized Forms” were opened for
signature in Kiev on March 6th and 15th 2002, respectively.162The sector of distribution
and transportation of oil and gas resources may become another real functional area of
cooperation.
Since its inauguration, BSEC members have sought to avoid military security
debates within the BSEC framework. Nevertheless, the BSEC does deal with security at
least on a superficial level in terms of some soft security issues. The BSEC provides
additional channels for multilateral and bilateral dialogue, and brings to the table
neighboring countries that have often viewed each other with deep suspicion and
mistrust. The BSEC has contributed to and supported significant progress in such
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important areas of cooperation such as trade, banking and finance, transport, energy and
electric networks, science, statistical data, combating organized crime, and
simplification of cross border and customs procedures, etc. The BSEC countries have no
illusions of solving all the region’s problems. However, they believe that by applying a
pragmatic concept of economic cooperation, as a reliable CSBM, with their knowledge
of the region and network of cooperation, they can promote trust between and among
countries.163
The geographical proximity, geo-strategic importance and transregional
characteristics require cooperation rather than conflict and competition among the BSEC
states. Currently the BSEC organization is seen as the most important CSBM in the
region that has the potential to contribute to overcoming potential new dividing lines. A
growing atmosphere of mutual acceptance, understanding and confidence, along with
bilateral and multilateral agreements between the member states increases hope for a
peaceful and prosperous Black Sea region in the future.164 But it should not be forgotten
that the BSEC’s new organizational identity demands much better coordination between
the BSEC and its subsidiary and affiliated bodies. The BSEC will significantly enhance
its overall effectiveness if it strengthens its various bodies and enables them to act as
complementary, mutually supportive elements in a single general framework.165
4.2. GUUAM
GUUAM (the acronym made up of the first letter of each member’s name:
Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) is a group of states with
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common problems and threat perceptions. As Taras Kuzio described, the GUUAM
countries make up the camp of “Pragmatic Westernizers” against the
“Russophile/Slavophil” camp in the 12 states of CIS.166 The GUUAM Group was
formally established as a political, economic and strategic alignment designed to
consolidate the independence and sovereignty of former Soviet Union republics. Their
common interests lie in the creation of a Europe-Caucasus-Asia energy transportation
corridor, support for territorial integrity and the resolution of separatist conflicts in
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. GUUAM also has a security component that
emphasizes a commonly held desire of member states to integrate into NATO and the
EU.167 The common interests of GUUAM countries are linked, directly or indirectly, in
opposition to Russian influence. GUUAM countries consider Russia disinterested in
resolving these conflicts because of Russia’s respecting the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the separatist parties. They believe that Russia has overtly or covertly
supported separatists.168 It is the undeniable fact that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova
all suffered from Moscow-backed secessionist movements in the first half of the 1990s,
and Ukraine had this fear in the past concerning Crimea.169 Therefore, all of them lay
enormous stress on territorial integrity.
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During six years of cooperation the GUUAM group has become an important
structure, which is aiming to enhance regional economic cooperation through the
development of a Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor. It has become a forum for
discussion on various levels of existing security problems, promoting conflict resolution
and the elimination of other risks and threats.170 It has also provided the emergence of
geopolitical pluralism in the former USSR. Analyzing the transformation process of
GUUAM from a loose consultative forum into a regional intergovernmental
organization might be of great value for grasping the main essence of its development
and of its internal dynamics.
4.2.1. Historical background of the GUUAM
The emergence of GUUAM was a unique event since it was establishing new
forms of cooperation in a region traditionally dominated by Russia. GUUAM emerged
primarily as an international initiative, with political, and security issues at the top of its
agenda. The rapprochement among the countries started during the summits of the
OSCE and Council of Europe (CoE). At these summits, commonalties were revealed
and the countries began to consult and coordinate their positions.171
The real impetus for cooperation among the representatives of Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine was provided by the growing international debate over
the revision of the CFE Treaty Conference in Vienna, in 1996. Each of the four countries
had similar stances on the level and status of the forces of the Russian Federation in the
northwest and southwest corners of the former Soviet Union, particularly in the former
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Odessa, Transcaucasus and North Caucasus military districts. Early on Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Moldova began to issue joint statements insisting that Russian troops on
their territory be withdrawn or significantly scaled down.172 The new governments were
concerned that Russia would use the treaty issue as a way of securing a permanent
military presence in the ‘near abroad’, and in some instances local Russian forces had
also been actively involved in aiding separatists.173
On October 10th, 1997 the Presidents of these countries came together in
Strasbourg during the summit of the Council of Europe and expressed their common
interests in developing bilateral and regional cooperation, European and regional
security, and political and economic contacts. They established a loose framework for
cooperation by declaring formal cooperation as the GUAM group (Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova). In the Joint Communiqué, the Presidents stressed the
significance of their cooperation in establishing a Eurasian, Trans-Caucasus
transportation corridor. They underlined the importance of strengthening cooperation
with the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of
state frontiers, mutual respect, cooperation, democracy, supremacy of law and respect
for human rights.174 At this Summit, GUAM cooperation was stated, by the founding
states, to focus on four policy areas: fighting separatism and the peaceful resolution of
conflicts; establishing a joint peacekeeping capability; developing the trade corridor
linking Europe to Central Asia through the Caucasus; and finally the integration of the
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member states into Euro-Atlantic and Atlantic structures.175 Based on their CFE
experience, the countries of GUAM began to focus on key issues at the CIS summit
meetings and continued to prepare joint positions on political and security questions in
advance of the OSCE ministerial meetings and summits.176 In 1997, they worked out a
proposal on the “16+4” formula for a consultation mechanism with NATO. The proposal
from Ukraine was discussed in NATO’s Political Committee, but NATO has resisted
recognizing GUAM within the confines of its EAPC.177
In April 1999 Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan refused to renew their
membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty, which had not been acceded by
Ukraine and Moldova.178 On April 24th, 1999, GUAM was enlarged by the joining of
Uzbekistan at the GUAM summit, which was held during NATO/EAPC’s Summit in
Washington D.C., on April 23rd-25th, 1999. Following the inclusion of Uzbekistan, the
acronym was changed to GUUAM.179At present, GUUAM states coordinate their
positions in the EACP and present their agreed positions either under the leadership of
Ukraine or Azerbaijan.
During the first eight months of 2000, Moldova and Uzbekistan, due to their
acute economic dependency on Russia, largely dropped out of GUUAM processes.
Since then, the US role in encouraging GUUAM members has played important part in
pulling the group back together again.180 On September 6th, 2000, at a meeting in New
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York in connection of the UN Millennium Summit, the GUUAM countries emphasized
multilateral cooperation within the framework of the group by giving it a multilevel
character. To this aim, they decided to convene regular Summits at the level of Heads of
State at least once a year, meetings at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs at least
twice a year, and regular sessions of the Committee of National Coordinators (CNC) on
a quarterly basis.
GUUAM has become more institutionalized despite the fact that Moldova was
strongly opposed to the idea and warned against turning GUUAM into an alternative to
the CIS.181 At the summit in Yalta on June 6th_7th 2001, GUUAM leaders signed a
charter that did not transform this intergovernmental group into an international
organization. They, however, agreed to convene annual meetings of heads of state, twice
yearly gatherings of ministers of foreign affairs (GUUAM executive body), and
quarterly meetings of GUUAM’s working body, the Committee of National
Coordinators.182 The Yalta GUUAM Charter183 puts forward the principal directions of
the forum, defines the objectives and principles of multilateral cooperation, and
promotes cooperation in political, trade and economic, humanitarian and other spheres
of mutual interest.184 In spite of military cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine and
Azerbaijan, GUUAM as a grouping has focused on economic issues, though member
states failed to agree to establish a free trade area at the Yalta Summit.185 In this summit,
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the five presidents declared to journalists that GUUAM was not intending to create its
own “military-political formation”.186
Uzbekistan had suspended its membership prior to 2002 Yalta Summit. Since
joining the organization, Tashkent appeared to lose enthusiasm and did not send anyone
to its ministerial meetings earlier than 2002. It is important to consider that Uzbekistan
left the CIS Collective Security Treaty and in 2001 joined the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization consisting of Russia, China, and three other former Central Asian
republics. Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov declared that their main
complaint had been the failure of GUUAM countries to remove legal obstacles for the
transportation of goods among them. He also left the possibility open for Uzbekistan to
resume its membership in GUUAM and stated that development of bilateral relations
with the remaining members is still one of the priorities of his country. 187 After
September 11th, the Uzbek government forged a bilateral security relationship with
Washington and this relationship has brought an estimated 8 billion-US dollars worth of
assistance to Uzbekistan. Thanks to this relationship, Uzbekistan established itself as
Central Asia’s major power. Thus, Tashkent’s interest in the security aspect of GUUAM
declined. Uzbekistan also plays a strategic role in the Central Asian Union (CAU).188
Uzbekistan’s suspension of its membership in GUUAM has acted as an “alarm bell” for
other members of GUUAM to take the actions necessary for further development.
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On July 19th-20th, 2002, in the GUUAM Yalta Summit, important steps were
taken by GUUAM countries and a number of significant documents, which enshrine
fundamental goals of GUUAM and are aimed at the achievement of strategic missions,
were adopted at the Yalta Summit. As in previous summits, the leaders of the four
countries underlined the need for the prevention of any actions aimed at the support of
separatist and extremist forces, and also at undermining the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of GUUAM Participating States in the Yalta Summit. They signed the
Declaration on Common Efforts to Ensure Stability in the Region in order to underline
the ways and methods for overcoming the challenges of international terrorism,
separatism, intolerance and extremism. Signing the Agreement on Cooperation among
the Governments of GUUAM Participating States in the Field of Combat Against
Terrorism, Organized Crime and Other Dangerous types of Crimes has stressed the
decisiveness of GUUAM countries on these subjects. The Agreement on the
Establishment of a Free Trade Area was also signed in the course of the Summit. It
might be assessed as another important action in improving the economic conditions and
the most efficient use of commercial potential of the GUUAM Participating States if the
early implementation of necessary domestic procedures and entry of this Agreement into
force is provided.189 In 2002, the planned project regarding the establishment of the
GUUAM Informational Office in Kiev was implemented. This body might take over
important responsibilities in the promotion of cooperation in the GUUAM framework
and the interaction of the Grouping with other States and international organizations and
institutions.
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Since 1997 GUUAM has continued its rather long period of its existence
despite the fact that pessimistic evaluations and comments predicting its disintegration
had been made by some analyst. If the decisions of the Yalta 2002 Summit are to be
implemented decisively and successfully by GUUAM members, GUUAM will continue
to play an important role in the CIS area despite being without Uzbekistan. In this
direction, one should not ignore the increasing support of the US to the organization in
spheres concerning the combat of terrorism and transnational crime, and the financing of
its multilateral projects to facilitate regional security and economic development.
4.2.2. Evaluation of GUUAM’s credibility
In terms of regional integration patterns, GUUAM's very existence represents a
welcome change from the post-Soviet style of the CIS and similar groupings. 190 The
formation and consolidation of GUUAM is unique in Eurasia for the simple reason that
it is a voluntary union of five states acting in an independent manner. The voluntary
nature of the group is of paramount significance for it sets a precedent of integration
based not so much on pressure from a stronger state, but on an understanding of
member-states' common national interests. 191  GUUAM provides its members with an
opportunity to act as "normal states." It has provided a place for its members to act like
countries in a key international arena, to negotiate, to share information, and to share
approaches rather than being played off against each other. That kind of cooperation
alone can be very significant for these states.192 GUUAM has promoted "a change in the
mentality" of the people of the region and given them a new self-confidence about the
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future. Moreover, even the limited joint initiatives within the group's framework indicate
its members' readiness to undertake responsibilities in a variety of spheres usually
reserved for more established states. The actual participation of Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Ukraine in international peacekeeping operations, discussions among GUUAM members
on securing regional transport corridors, and joint anti-trafficking efforts are examples of
this.193
GUUAM's role as a link between the areas of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea is,
without a doubt, just another of the numerous advantages it can provide in terms of
cooperation.194 Located at important transit crossroads the GUUAM Member States
have great importance for routes of transportation between East and West, Europe and
Asia. Development of transportation infrastructures positively affects strengthening both
domestic and foreign economic links of GUUAM. There are also many potential conflict
zones in the regional space of GUUAM. They can generate intrastate and ethnic
conflicts of medium intensity. They may expand both vertically and horizontally.
Regional integration through economic and political cooperation can facilitate easing
internal potential conflicts in GUUAM countries. Even a limited potential of cooperation
within GUUAM, will become a positive factor of international safety in the Black Sea
Region.195
Despite the fact that it was launched on the basis of common interests and by
countries pursuing similar goals, GUUAM has so far remained a loose alliance of five
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post-Soviet states. In reality, many initiatives discussed by members have never been
implemented. The decisions taken by GUUAM members during the successive Yalta
Summits in 2001 and 2002 might be seen as important steps towards strengthening the
organization. It should be noted that the adaptation of the charter was an important step
for even closer cooperation among members since it has laid down the basis for the
creation of common institutions and an effective decision-making process. These
summits have shown that the GUUAM countries are willing to strengthen ties.
Nevertheless, both the political and economic weaknesses of the participating states
make the organization too vulnerable and dependent on external factors and powers.196
That’s why, external support of the Western powers, especially of the US, and the
policies of the Russian Federation toward GUUAM seem more influential regarding the
efficiency of GUUAM in the ongoing process.
From the very outset, GUUAM has had an implicit anti-Russian character, all
the declarations to the contrary notwithstanding.197 In fact, such an assertion does not
reflect the whole reality. Although the group emphasizes that it is not directed against
any country or group of states, Russia still suspects that it wants to bypass Russia. It
condemns GUUAM's departure from the grouping’s initial focus on Caspian oil and gas
pipelines, and Eurasian transport projects and charges that the coalition is stepping up
military cooperation. Together with the CAU, GUUAM is an organization within the
framework of the CIS where Russia is not a member. While the group was indeed born
from the efforts of member-states to oppose excessive concentrations of troops on their
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territories and in their vicinity during the CFE negotiations in 1996, all GUUAM
countries recognize Russia's importance and key role in the region. 198 On the one hand,
GUUAM members are attempting to free themselves from the post-Soviet patterns of
cooperation under Russia’s domination. On the other, they pursue multi-vector foreign
policies based upon pragmatic economic cooperation within CIS and political-military
security with transatlantic and European structures, particularly with NATO.199
GUUAM's objective is not opposing anyone but enhancing cooperation among its
members. Similarly, Russia's long-term interests are served better by its neighbors
becoming stronger, responsible partner-states rather than by facing perpetual instability,
being weak and dependent countries.200
GUUAM is not an artificial organization based on coercion, but is the coming
together of five countries with common problems and threat perceptions. Some analysts
refer to GUUAM as a US-backed initiative, while others explain that the US did not
inspire the process. In fact, initially the US was against such coalition-building, the issue
of conventional forces’ flank limitation agreement in Europe and the resulting delay
with the modification of the CFE Treaty irritated the US government, and only much
later did the US start to show interest towards GUUAM. Especially after the September
11th terrorist attacks, the US has increased its support to GUUAM by facilitating
financial aid and providing some military training capabilities.201 The continued
existence of GUUAM is proof that geopolitical pluralism has eventually emerged in
CIS. It is a fact that this geopolitical pluralism and Russia’s domestic difficulties are
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preventing Russia’s revival as a “great power” through the creation of a new union
around itself. Therefore, Western countries feel that they should continue to promote
geopolitical pluralism in the CIS through a more active bilateral and multilateral
engagement with GUUAM.202
The only certainty for GUUAM is that the group’s future is likely to be
determined by the level of economic cooperation between its members. In other words,
GUUAM's future certainly depends on its members and the progress of the concrete
cooperative initiatives they undertake. However, the group's success or failure is also
likely to greatly depend on the extent of U.S. support and encouragement. Its member
states have shown that, in spite of many challenges, they are willing and able to work
together in order to promote positive changes in their region. Hopefully, GUUAM's
western partners are able to recognize the group's promising potential and help realize
it.203
If the group is to succeed in the implementation of a free trade zone, GUUAM
might become a strong alternative to CIS, whose convention on free trade is ineffective.
Indeed, the establishment of GUUAM radically differs from the integration processes
within CIS, which was created on a negative impulse to restore the past and give Russia
political leverage, while the aspirations of GUUAM countries are based on economic
logic and a desire to strengthen regional stability and security.204 Despite the pessimistic
remarks made by some analysts, concerning its future, GUUAM has been consistently
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moving towards deepening and broadening its interactivity and partnership, based on a
solid ground of common interests and common aspirations.205 It seems that the GUUAM
organization will exist as a cooperative security arrangement and continue to contribute
to the peace, security and stability in the Black Sea region.
4.3. The Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR)
In April 2001, ministers and authorized representatives of the Black Sea littoral
states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine) signed
an Agreement on the establishment of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group,
known as BLACKSEAFOR206. By this Agreement, all littoral states came together for
the first time in the history of the region to pull their naval forces into a joint formation
in order to enhance regional stability and friendship, and to improve interoperability.
The formation of BLACKSEAFOR might be viewed as proof for the assumption
emphasizing that cooperation and joint action stand as valuable instruments for security
from both a political and a military perspective207.
The formation of BLACKSEAFOR was reached through a three-year
negotiation process. Before providing information on the formation, it will be of value to
mention the development process of CSBMs with regard to naval activities in the Black
Sea. It should not be ignored that this process created a suitable atmosphere that led to
the formation of BLACKSEAFOR.
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4.3.1. Historical background
That military/political role of the navies in dealing with regional crises is
increasing. Russian proposals notifying and observing certain types of naval activities,
exchanging annual plans of such activities, and military information and visiting naval
bases had been rejected during the talks in the 1994 Vienna Document of confidence-
building and security measures. Although, from the Russian point of view, the initiative
was not aimed at restricting activities of the navies and was only intended to enhance
transparency of these activities, many influential Western countries opposed these
proposals by stating that it would be contrary to international law and would limit free
navigation. As a result the sea was not involved in either the 1994 or 1999 version of the
Vienna Document. Difficulties concerning the issue in the OSCE framework gave way
for a number of interested states to approach the question from a regional perspective.208
Firstly in 1993, Ukraine led an initiative to develop CSBMs with regard to
naval activities in the Black Sea. Some distinct characteristics of the Black Sea made
this initiative valuable for the region. The Black Sea is a landlocked sea and the 1936
Montreux Convention, in essence, was a major confidence building measure. Following
successive negotiations, all littoral states signed a political document under the name of
“Guidelines”, by which all sides put forward their decisiveness to cooperate. They
adopted the “guidelines” in the Black Sea on February 23rd, 1998. Since then, Ukraine
has assumed the role of coordinator of the talks. The negotiations took ten rounds and
approximately four years to agree on the text of the final document.
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During the nine-round negotiations, the Russian Federation proposed that the
restrictions on navigation freedom should have been applied to third parties, including
NATO’s actions on the Black Sea. But this proposal was rejected by all of the other
littoral states. Turkey’s views have consisted of these following considerations:
1) This should be a regional arrangement and it should not stand as a base
for other regions of the world.
2) This arrangement should not restrict navigational freedom.
3) It should not bring any additional limitations except limitations for third
parties stated in international agreements involving the Montreux Convention.
4) The joint action, which will be executed jointly with third parts, should be
treated beyond the scope of this arrangement.209
 The tenth round of negotiations for the regime of CSBMs in the Black Sea
were held in Vienna on the 1st-2nd November 2001. Thanks to the balancing conciliatory
role of Turkey from the beginning of the talks, all sides came to an agreement during
this meeting in Vienna. The final text on CSBMs, with regard to naval activities in the
Black Sea, was signed on the 25th April 2002 by six Black Sea states. The document
came into force on January 1st, 2003 due to the preparation needed for implementing it.
This document contains a broad spectrum of voluntary forms of cooperation. Joint
exercises, courtesy visits by naval ships, exchanging all sorts of delegations, and annual
reciprocal visits of naval bases are among some of the forms.  This document is of great
value thanks to it being the first regional regime of CSBMs regarding naval activities.
Almost concurrently with the confidence-building negotiations, the idea of
setting up in the Black Sea an ad hoc naval cooperation task group involving the same
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six littoral states was proposed by former Turkish Navy Forces Commander Salim
Dervişoğlu in 1998. The idea was approved and, as a rule, delegates met for three-day
sessions once every three months in seaside cities of the parties involved. The countries
signed a letter of intent in Ankara on June 28th, 2000.210 In the end all littoral states
signed the Agreement establishing the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group known
as BLACKSEAFOR on April 2nd, 2001 in Istanbul. The importance of
BLACKSEAFOR outweighs the significance of CSBMs. Unlike the latter, the former
was signed not as a political document but as a legal agreement subject to ratification by
the parties.211 The inauguration ceremony for the first gathering of BLACKSEAFOR
happened on September 27th, 2001 on the Turkish base Gölcük.212 Beginning from this
date, planned exercises have been conducted regularly.213
4.3.2. General features of BLACKSEAFOR
Free will and reaching decisions by consensus are the basis of
BLACKSEAFOR group’s operations. Despite the fact that BLACKSEAFOR is
composed of naval elements only, without the direct participation from Air or Land
Forces, it can be supported by elements from other services if necessary.
BLACKSEAFOR is not purely a military organization. Neither is it directed against any
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state, nor intended to be a military alliance. Since it is open to participation of third
states by consensus of the Parties, it has a transparent formation.214
The mission of the Force is to contribute to and strengthen friendship, good
neighborly relations and mutual confidence among the Black Sea littoral states and thus,
to contribute to peace and stability in the Black Sea region through the enhancement of
cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces. Among the main tasks of the
Force are search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance operations, mine
sweeping operations, environmental protection, goodwill visits and any other tasks
agreed by all the parties. In scope and membership, BLACKSEAFOR differs greatly
from a similar formation called the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) in the Baltic.
BALTRON only consists of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
excludes other littoral states and covers only de-mining missions.
When instructed by the Foreign/Defense Ministers or their authorized
representatives, BLACKSEAFOR can be called upon to perform the above-mentioned
tasks. This could also be done as part of peace operations under the auspices of the UN
Security Council or the OSCE upon request from these organizations.215
BLACKSEAFOR is intended to operate in the Black Sea, but it can be deployed
elsewhere if all the parties choose to do so.
Each activated group will be composed of at least 4-6 ships from the different
parties. Main classes of ships that could be allocated to the Force are frigate/destroyer
(FF/DD), corvette/patrol boat (FS/PB), mine counter measure (MSM) ship, amphibious
ship (LS), auxiliary ship and vessel (AX), and other types of naval vessels including
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maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and helicopters. The Force can be activated to respond to
calls to tackle concrete tasks in extreme situations. In the absence of it the group will
come together once a year for one or one and a half months of training cruises as part of
the planned activation for mission rehearsals. A request for an unscheduled activation
might be made by any of the parties. As an on- call force, units allocated to
BLACKSEAFOR will remain at their permanent bases during non-activation periods.
Similarly, the group has no permanent headquarters however the state that assumes
command will provide them.216 Logistical support of participating forces and all the
expenses related to BLACKSEAFOR activity is a national responsibility.
The Commander of BLACKSEAFOR (COMBLACKSEAFOR) is a naval
officer of the rank of Rear Admiral or Captain designated by the Black Sea Naval
Commanders Committee (BSNC). The COMBLACKSEAFOR is appointed for a one-
year period and the position rotates in the alphabetical order among the Parties. While he
is responsible for the Tactical Command of the group, BSNC is responsible for
Operational Command of the Force. The BSNC is an executive body composed of the
Parties’ naval chiefs or Black Sea fleet commanders. Foreign and defense ministers meet
annually, in principle, to take and carry out political decisions and to provide overall
political guidance to the BSNC.
4.3.3. Importance of the formation
In the view of the above, the formation of BLACKSEAFOR can be considered
as the most concrete military CSBM in the Black Sea region. Certain aspects show it is
of particular importance. The military-operational importance of BLACKSEAFOR, as
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well as the document on CSBMs concerning naval activities in the Black Sea is
indisputable. That the Black Sea littoral states are gathered for the first naval formation
in the Black Sea makes this formation significant from a military perspective.
It is an undeniable fact that the political importance of BLACKSEAFOR
outweighs its military significance. All littoral states in the Black Sea region have
overcome the political and psychological barrier by extending CSBMs to naval forces
for the first time in international arms control history.217 The cooperation through joint
actions under the umbrella of BLACKSEAFOR and other regional CSBMs may enhance
cooperation among not only naval forces, but also among people. The mindsets of the
decision makers of the littoral countries may also be affected positively.218 Thus, it
brings together all the littoral states.
BLACKSEAFOR also has a humanitarian aspect. Among its tasks are search
and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance operations, and environmental protection.
This indicates that the formation gives particular significance to human security and
environmental security. The environmental role of the Force could become important as
the number of ships carrying oil across the Black Sea increases. Thus, it enhances the
countries' ability to act in a coordinated way to deal with problems concerning soft and
hard security.
In view of the above, one can argue that the formation of BLACKSEAFOR, in
addition to the document on regional naval CSBMs in the Black Sea, as a cooperative
security initiative, has contributed to enhancing cooperation and friendship in the region.
It confirms the willingness of the region's countries to work together in a wide range of
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areas. Now it is one of the symbols of cooperation and partnership in the Black Sea
region. It is also hoped that the BLACKSEAFOR initiative will contribute to the
widening and harmonizing of European security by supporting the principle of
indivisibility of security.
Despite varying national interests, differing political assessments and diverse
stages of development of the participating states, the countries in the Black Sea region
have continued to seek common solutions to their problems through dialogue, economic
cooperation, and creating an environment conducive to regional stability. It seems that
they are well aware of the fact that the geographical proximity, geo-strategic importance
and transregional characteristic of the region require cooperation rather than conflict and
competition.
The BSEC is an important, highly institutionalized and the only comprehensive
regional cooperative security organization in the Black Sea region. GUUAM is
consistently moving towards deepening and broadening its interactivity and partnership,
based on a solid understanding of common interests and aspirations. Both of them act as
economic CSBMs. BLACKSEAFOR, together with other regional military CSBMs
enhance cooperation among not only naval forces, but also of the people in general. The
mindsets of these littoral countries are also affected in a way that may make them more
open to cooperation. All of these groups might be seen as effective cooperative security
initiatives that keep on providing security, stability and prosperity in the Black Sea
region.
The cooperative efforts of these institutions comprise main cooperative security
initiatives at a regional level. One should also take into account the role of wider
European organizations in promoting peace, security and stability in the region.
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Analyzing the activities of the OSCE, NATO and the EU might provide a wider
perspective while examining the cooperative efforts in the Black Sea region.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ROLE OF WIDER EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS IN
PROMOTING
 COOPERATION IN THE REGION
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a general acceptance that new
multi-institutional security architecture has emerged in and around Europe. From a
wider perspective, cooperative security arrangements in the Black Sea region may be
seen as subregional initiatives that have the potential to contribute to European security
by bringing together diverse groups of states in cooperative frameworks in dealing with
specific ‘soft security’ problems. In conformity with this view, the BSEC might be
classified as one of these subregional organizations in the Black Sea region. Up to now,
we tried to shed light on cooperative security by analyzing regional internal dynamics of
the Black Sea region. We should not ignore the role of the wider international
organizations in promoting peace, security and stability in the region.
In the European political landscape, there are three major organizations, NATO,
the European Union (EU), and the OSCE. The EU and NATO continue to provide
political, economic and military security for their members. But, they have also taken on
new tasks of expanding their memberships to cover countries from the CEE, developing
cooperative ties with both prospective members and those states not likely to join these
organizations, and developing operational conflict management and peacekeeping roles.
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The OSCE continues to provide broad normative frameworks for European security
through the principles of democracy and human rights, but it has also adopted new
operational roles in areas such as election monitoring, support for democratization,
conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building.219 It may be said that the Black Sea
region is perceived as one of the subregions in the European continent from the
standpoint of these wider international organizations. The Black Sea countries have
close interactions with these organizations. (Table 2 presents different levels of
institutionalized relationship between them). Recently, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU
have become much more supportive of subregional cooperation from Barents to the
Black Sea. These wider international organizations are very effective in domestic and
foreign policy making processes of the countries in the region, analyzing the activities
and perspectives of the EU, NATO and the OSCE in the Black Sea region has great
value in grasping their roles in promoting cooperation in the Black Sea region.
5.1. OSCE’s Perspective of the Black Sea Region
Today the OSCE is the widest European security organization with 55 members
including all of the Black Sea states. OSCE unites a much greater number of members
than NATO and the EU in the vast space from Vancouver to Vladivostok as a Eurasian
political organization.220 Although for most of its first two decades the OSCE/CSCE221
had a drawn-out process of political, social, and normative negotiations in the form of
irregular, multilateral conferencing. It is now a full-fledged international organization.
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The OSCE plays an important role in promoting peace and security in the European
continent, including the Black Sea region. The principle of cooperative security, a
comprehensive understanding of security, and a strong emphasis on dialogue are among
the main characteristics of the OSCE.222 The cooperative efforts and activities of the
OSCE have contributed directly and indirectly to the peace, security and stability of the
Black Sea Region.
The OSCE tries to provide security in the broadest sense. It goes beyond its
core military aspects to cover cooperation on economic, social, and human rights issues,
which are essential underpinnings of cooperative security and stable international
relations. Various treaties have been signed under the auspices of the CSCE/OSCE. The
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in November 1991 and the
“Open Skies” Treaty in March 1992, which were not formally negotiated within the
CSCE/OSCE, fall into the category of security building through arms control under the
OSCE umbrella.223 The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security224 in
1994, and the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures and
Exchange of Military Information in 1994 are only some of the treaties. The Forum for
Security Co-operation (FSC) is a decision-making body for negotiations on arms
control, disarmament, and CSBMs, regular consultations on security related matters also
take place in this forum. It is an undeniable fact that all of these developments enhanced
the cooperation among member countries in the first half of the 1990s. Considering that
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all of the Black Sea countries are among the members of the OSCE, it is not difficult to
say that these developments have created a suitable atmosphere for them to cooperate
with each other. To put it briefly, the Black Sea region has benefited indirectly from the
cooperative activities of the OSCE in its area of responsibility.
It should be noted that OSCE engagement in the Black Sea region has been of
segmented nature over the past years. Although the OSCE together with other
international organizations provide the principles on which the subregional organizations
in the Black Sea area are based, the links between them are still rather weak.225 Some
consider the OSCE to be best suited for the task of coordinating subregional efforts due
to its inclusive, pan-European membership, its broad definition of security and its
cooperative approach.226 One may consider that the role of the OSCE is particularly
focused on post-conflict settlement and the prevention of conflict resumption in the
Black Sea region.227 Although the OSCE has acted as a framework for discussions of
cooperative approaches to subregional problems in areas such as the Black Sea and
South-Eastern Europe, it has focused on turbulent spots and security issues in individual
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Table 2: Participation of Black Sea countries in Europe’s security
architecture (as of June 2003)228
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Albania ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Armenia ♦ PCA ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Azerbaijan ♦ PCA ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Bulgaria ♦ AC ♦ • ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Georgia ♦ PCA ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Greece ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Moldova ♦ PCA ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Romania ♦ AC ♦ • ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Russia ♦ PCA ♦ (1) ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Turkey ♦ AC ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Ukraine ♦ PCA ♦ (2) ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Abbreviations: AC: Admission Candidate; BEAC: Barents Euro-Arctic Council; BSEC: Black Sea
Economic Cooperation; CBSS: Council of Baltic Sea States; CEI: Central European Initiative; CEFTA:
Central European Free Trade Association; EAPC: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; O: Observer; PCA:
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; PfP: Partnership for Peace; SECI: Southeast European
Cooperation Initiative; SEE: Southeast Europe; SEECP: Southeast European Cooperation Process; (1):
NATO-Russia Founding Act; (2): NATO-Ukraine Charter; • : Scheduled for membership in 2004.
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Black Sea countries. The whole region has not been in the foreground of OSCE concerns
and activities.231 In this regard, it may be helpful to overlook the activities of the OSCE
in several turbulent spots in the Black Sea region.
5.1.1. OSCE activities in the conflict areas of the region
In accordance with the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration, the OSCE has
developed various methods of sending official missions and personal representatives of
the Chairman-in-Office for fact-finding, reporting, monitoring and “good offices”
purposes. The OSCE is the specialized Euro-Atlantic-Asiatic institution for early
warning, conflict-prevention, crisis and post-crisis management and rehabilitation. The
expertise accumulated by the OSCE missions in the region indicates that this
organization is capable of acting as a medium for conflict resolution. Concerning
conflict situations, OSCE has achieved quite substantial progress in different parts of the
Black Sea Region. Recent efforts in Moldova, Northern Caucasus, Georgia, Albania,
Azerbaijan and Armenia should not be overlooked. OSCE observer and reporter
missions have been sent into an increasing number of regional trouble spots in countries
such as Russia (in Chechnya), Georgia (in South Ossetia), Azerbaijan (in Nagorno-
Karabakh), Moldova (in Transdniestr), Ukraine and Albania. Top OSCE officials have
also personally conducted missions in these areas.232
The OSCE Mission to Moldova (since 1993, 10 international members) has
been working to facilitate a framework for dialogue and negotiation concerning a lasting
peace settlement in Moldova. OSCE efforts are focused on the withdrawal of foreign
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(Russian) troops and weapons and the status of Transdniestr. In December 1999,
“ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and
armaments and coordination of financial and technical assistance” was added to this
mandate.233 The implementation of a tripartite plan for the disposal of 40,000 tons of
Soviet weapons and ammunition submitted by the OSCE in 2001 is progressing slowly.
Even though Russia committed itself to complete the process of withdrawal by 2002 at
the OSCE Istanbul Summit, the withdrawal has not been completely implemented so
far.234 By November 2002, only six trainloads had left the Transdniestr region of
Moldova.235 With regards to the status of Transdniestr, a lot remains to be done, and
common grounds for a solution were not yet found despite the fact that the OSCE has
achieved some progress in resolving the problem.236
The OSCE presence in Albania (since 1997, 38 international members)
represents one of the rare cases of OSCE field activity without an ethno-political
background. The mission was mandated to consolidate democratization, freedom of the
media, human rights, and the collection of weapons and to contribute to election
preparation and monitoring.237 In 1997, the mandate was enhanced to provide “flexible
coordination of the efforts of the international community” and to serve “as a clearing-
house for information on the international efforts in Albania”. In 1997 the OSCE
chairman-in-Office’s Personal Representative assisted in finding a political solution to
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the crisis in Albania. The OSCE monitored the resulting elections.238 Since 1997, the
OSCE has acted as a main coordinator for foreign assistance within the framework of
cooperative security in Europe in Albania. 239 In addition, the mission has also been the
local chair of the Friends of Albania Group (FOA)240, which held its Sixth International
Conference in April 2002 under the auspices of the Chairman in Office and the Spanish
European Union Presidency.
The Northern Caucasus remains the most difficult challenge confronting the
OSCE. The Mandate of the Assistance Group to Chechnya (AG), originally adopted in
1995 ad interim, was changed in 2001 to be renewed yearly. As in previous years,
during 2002, the AG remained the only independent field presence of international
organization in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation. The OSCE, together
with the CoE, is the only international organization that permanently deployed staff over
the course of 2002. The mandate was not extended, however, for 2003 and the AG
ceased to exist at the end of 2002.241 The AG used much of its resources for monitoring
and reporting activities where rule of law and human rights were a high priority.
The Mission to Georgia has been in operation since December 1992. It has been
involved in promoting a peaceful settlement of conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
It tries to monitor and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It also helps in the improvement of civil society
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and democratic institutions. Since mid-2002, the mission appointed an officer for the
purpose of monitoring economic and environmental developments related to security.
The monitoring operation on the border between Georgia and Chechnya is a very
positive example of OSCE conflict prevention capacities. In order to prevent the
potential spillover of the Chechen crisis into Georgia, the OSCE has sent around 40
international monitors, who were carrying out patrols on the Georgian-Russian border
since December 1999. The mission was extended in December 2001 to include the
Georgia-Ingushetia border.242 Since 2000, the Mission has observed and reported on
movements across the border between Georgia and the Chechen republic of the Russian
Federation and, since the start of 2002, across the Ingush segment of the border. The
OSCE also focuses its attention on the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, one of the so-
called frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus. Negotiations are being carried out
among all the parties in the conflict, as well as with the Russian Federation and North
Ossetian representatives.243 In the South Caucasus, the OSCE is actively supporting the
UN-led peace process in Abkhazia Georgia, which is aimed at a peaceful resolution to
the conflict. In addition, the OSCE mission to Georgia is seconding staff to the UN
Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia (HROAG).244
The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group and the OSCE Chair continue to
support the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia in their efforts to facilitate a peaceful
solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Special attempts are made to promote CBMs
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in the military, economic and humanitarian spheres between two countries. The OSCE
has continued to provide a framework for discussions between the two countries through
its 11-nation Minsk Group, which from early 1997 was co-chaired by France, Russia and
the US. Certain proposals of the OSCE Chairman in Office are currently under
review.245 The OSCE office in Yerevan was established in March 2000 to promote the
implementation of OSCE principles and commitments in all dimensions. From 2002 the
Office began working in the field of military and security cooperation. Implementing the
mandate from the Office of the Personal Representative (PR) of the Chairman-in-Office
is closely connected with the tasks dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Group (MG) and its
Co-Chairman.
Together, the OSCE Mission to Ukraine (1994-1997, 4-6 international
members) and the HCNM substantially facilitated a constitutional solution for the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, but their contribution to improving the situation of the
national minorities there, namely the Crimean Tatars, remained limited. In 1999 the
mission was replaced by a project coordinator with a much more limited mandate to
plan, implement, and monitor projects between relevant authorities of Ukraine and the
OSCE. The OSCE mission had been perceived by Ukrainian officials as a stigmatization
of the country.246 Freedom of the media, trafficking in human beings, establishing legal
norms in the military and addressing environmental issues have been the subjects of
specific projects.
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5.1.2. Other Activities
In addition to above-mentioned missions, the OSCE has provided member
states, as well as Black Sea countries, with election monitoring. In 1992, the Office for
free Elections (established in 1990) was renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR). Today, the ODIHR is the leading pan-European agency
for election observation. In 2000, more than 3,000 ODIHR observers monitored 15
elections.247 The HCNM has been active in more than a dozen transnational countries,
including Albania, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.
The HCNM has dealt with minority language use and education (in Macedonia and
Romania), and minority participation in public life, from increased representation to
arrangements of autonomy (in Crimea/Ukraine). In addition to other newly invented
mechanisms, these initiatives have contributed to reducing the tension in conflict areas
of the Black Sea region.
At several summits, it was stressed that the OSCE should adopt a more
coordinating role in relations among various regional cooperative initiatives. In Lisbon
in 1996, a direct link was set up between the OSCE and subregional frameworks. The
Lisbon Summit Declaration states that ‘the OSCE could contribute to using fully the
potential of various regional cooperative efforts in a mutually supportive and reinforcing
way.’ In line with the 1999 Platform for Cooperative Security, the OSCE was offered as
an Organization that ‘can take on a coordinating role for inter- and intra-regional
initiatives’.248 The GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) group was
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established while the participating states coordinating their positions relating to the CFE
Treaty arrangements within the OSCE on an ad hoc basis.249 After being asked to
provide support to the GUUAM countries on the implementation of the Free Trade
Agreement signed in July, 2002 by the Heads of State of Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and
Azerbaijan, the OSCE Secretariat’s Office of the Coordinator on Economic and
Environmental Activities (OCEEA) organized a working party in Kiev, Ukraine in
November, 2002.250
              In a nutshell, the OSCE has acted as a common ground for discussions of
cooperative approaches to regional problems in the areas of the Black Sea and South-
Eastern Europe.251 The OSCE, together with the EU, already provide the principles on
which cooperative security initiatives in the Black sea region are based, but links
between them are still rather weak. 252 The adoption of the Document-Charter for
European Security, in particular the Platform for Cooperative Security and the
appointment of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities might
improve the interaction between the OSCE and the cooperative initiatives in the Black
Sea region. However, it should not be disregarded that the regional cooperative efforts in
the Black Sea region are challenged by a lack of resources. Although the OSCE plays an
important role in strengthening and developing the normative foundation of Europe’s
security and in assisting countries in transition, it cannot provide financial and project-
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oriented support, and it cannot be used as a forum for infrastructure programs.253 While
the OSCE may act as a broad framework for encouraging regional cooperation, its lack
of political leverage and material resources compared to the EU and NATO is likely to
limit its role in the Black Sea region.254
5.2. NATO’s Vision for the Region
In the post-Cold War era NATO has transformed itself in order to meet the
imperatives of the new security environment. It may be said that the membership and
partnership aspects of geographical enlargement together with functional enlargement
has preserved NATO’s credibility and ensured its survival. Today, NATO is among the
most powerful security structures in the world. Taking into account NATO’s continuing
significance for the Euro-Atlantic area and its enhanced relationships with all of the
Black Sea countries at various levels, one cannot disregard the positive role of its
activities in the security and stability of the Black Sea region.  In this context, it might be
argued that NATO’s transformation through acquiring new members and inventing new
institutional mechanisms, such as the PfP and the EAPC, have contributed to the security
of the Black Sea region directly or indirectly. It should be noted that NATO
enlargement, together with EU expansion, can be considered among the most stabilizing
factors for the region.
From the perspective of NATO, regional security should be perceived within
the European security, and should not be directed against anyone. For NATO, basic
principles of cooperative security should be activated through regional security
arrangements. Although NATO sees regional cooperation as a means of enhancing good
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neighborly relations among different countries, its involvement in the region is
predominantly targeted at separate countries rather than at the region as such.255
NATO’s relations with the countries of the Black Sea region have steadily developed
and extended to many different levels. Although it is clear that NATO could not provide
solutions to all problems of the region, it has a stake there, not only because Turkey
borders this volatile area but also because the security of the countries to its south and
east are a concern to NATO’s own security. NATO’s relations with the Russian
Federation and Ukraine have a special importance.
NATO is actively establishing itself in the Black Sea. NATO’s instrument for
this policy is the program known as the PfP, which all Black Sea countries have joined.
In the new situation developing in the region, as a result of the conclusion of relevant
accords, NATO’s southern flank is shifting northward, which means that the Black Sea
has become one of its components.256 However, one can say that NATO prefers to use
its own recently invented cooperative mechanisms rather than regional or subregional
security arrangements in the Black Sea region.
5.2.1. Impact of NATO’s enlargement
The process of NATO enlargement might be considered to be a progressive
means of contributing to the enhanced stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area,
including the Black Sea region. The possibility of NATO membership has already given
many states of the CEE an incentive to put an end to old quarrels, border disputes or
other unresolved security-related issues. In this framework, a number of bilateral treaties
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have already been signed. The treaties of Romania-Hungary, Romania-Ukraine, and
Poland-Ukraine are just a few which relate to the Black Sea states.257
NATO was also interested in increasing its activities in the South Caucasus,
particularly in the area of regional cooperation on “soft” security issues. Increased
NATO-Russia cooperation has great importance in the region. The Alliance’s “Open
Door” policy will significantly influence stability and security in the Black Sea region.
The NATO enlargement is likely to affect the countries included in the Military Action
Plan (MAP), such as Romania and Bulgaria, and particularly the countries in the
Caucasus and Central Asia.
“Membership Action Plans” were formulated to prepare Albania, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia for
membership. The next actual enlargement was agreed on at the Prague Summit on
November 21st-22nd, 2002. At this summit invitations were extended to Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (See Figure 3). The
incorporation of both Romania and Bulgaria will certainly enhance the existing security
cooperation and strengthen the security structure in the Black Sea region. It is not
difficult to guess that the security produced in the Black Sea region will be projected to
Caucasus and contribute to the security of the Caspian and Central Asian energy
resources. As Lord Robertson, NATO’s Secretary General, said, “...together with the
expansion of the EU, the next round of NATO enlargement will be a major step towards
a long-standing goal of the Alliance: to create a Europe whole and free, united in peace,
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democracy and common values, from the Baltic to the Balkans, from the Atlantic to the
Black Sea”258.
Figure 3: Europe after the next round of NATO enlargement259
5.2.2. Contributions of NATO's institutional mechanisms
Since the end of the Cold War NATO has invented new institutional
mechanisms. These mechanisms can be classified as multilateral and bilateral
mechanisms concerning the Black Sea region (See Figure 3 for all structural
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mechanisms). While the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), then EAPC, and
PfP constitute the multilateral component, NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine
institutional links constitute the bilateral one.
Figure 4: NATO’s structural mechanisms (as of 2002)260
5.2.2.1. Multilateral institutional mechanisms
In the 1990s, NATO had tried to respond to the desires of Europe’s new
democracies to become part of the NATO-centered security system261 and had
developed several mechanisms in order to reach this objective. From December 1991,
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NATO’s dialogue and cooperation with its Partner countries in the Black Sea region
took place in the framework of (NACC). The NACC was open to former WP states and
to the Newly Independent States (NIS). Its main focus was largely on military
cooperation.262 The NACC contributed to the promotion of good neighborly relations,
disarmament and arms control, peacekeeping, and provided a substantial contribution to
strengthening cooperation among NATO Allies and Partner countries. The NACC was
little more than a forum for discussions and did not meet the security guarantees that the
applicants wanted. NATO, therefore, established another affiliate with a little more
military substance, namely the Partnership for Peace (PfP), under the auspices of which
various military exercises and other forms of practical cooperation have taken place.
 NATO adopted the PfP program at its January 1994 Summit. It provides for
military assistance to non-NATO member countries in order to modernize the military in
defense sectors, reform of military and defense budgets in view of enlargement, and
prepare their armed for peace-keeping requirements.263 Contributing to interstate
relations is one of the key principles of the PfP program. The PfP has been referred to as
a “geopolitical eraser”, removing or weakening sharp dividing lines between NATO
members and non-members.264 Through the PfP program and other cooperative
mechanisms, NATO is promoting closer ties between their allies and countries in the
region. NATO does not want to import troubles into the alliance. It is believed that the
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prospect of getting closer to NATO enhances good neighborly relations.265 It also serves
both as a framework for the evaluation of potential new NATO members and a
mechanism for joint military training and exercises between interested non-NATO
nations of the region and the Alliance. 266 The PfP program in particular has expanded
steadily and now comprises 27 partners offering a broad gamut of activities, including
numerous military-to-military relations. All of the Black Sea countries are included in
this program. NATO continues to give advice and practical assistance to them. After the
NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, the July 1997 Madrid Summit introduced an
enhanced PfP, thus the PfP has become more relevant and operational. The PfP has
played a significant role for NATO in exporting different country’s traditions of civilian
authority, parliamentary habits, and devotions to human rights.267
The PfP program was to remain an integral element of the new cooperative
mechanism, incorporating practical military and defense-related cooperation activities. It
represents multinational platform for consultations and aims at enhancing coordination
among participants. After the Albanian political and financial crisis in the winter of
1997, NATO set up an enhanced PfP for Albania. The great value of the practical
experience that countries receive from the PfP was especially apparent in the South
Caucasian area. The countries in the South Caucasus are involved in common planning,
standardization, policy-making processes and joint military exercises. The PfP
contributes to the security of the South Caucasus directly and indirectly by providing
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some training to countries’ security structures and by increasing the level of cooperation
with Western institutions. Institutional interactions between NATO and non-member
countries of the region provide the newly independent states with a chance to coordinate
their security policies with new partners.268
In the military dimension NATO has conducted a number of useful exercises in
the Black Sea region, both within and in the spirit of PfP programs, with partner-states.
As a result, a community of professionals in the military is being created, ties are
blossoming, and a chain-reaction effect is expected. Nevertheless, the Russian
Federation regretfully remains passive and uninvolved for political
reasons.269Multilateral PfP military exercises in areas such as peacekeeping training, sea
rescue and mine clearance have regularly occurred on a subregional basis and have
brought together states not only from the Baltic and Black Seas, but also from Central
and South-Eastern Europe. These exercises have contributed to building cooperation and
confidence between participant states.270 PfP activities have helped Black Sea states to
reform/develop their armed forces. The enhanced PfP set up in 1997 also covers an
expanded subregional dimension. It allows for greater participation of partners within
NATO’s subregional commands of CJTF planning and exercises.
A stronger and more operational partnership between NATO and its NACC
partners started to take shape in 1997 with the replacement of the NACC by the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). All of the Black Sea countries are members of the
EAPC. The Council is the key vehicle non-NATO members use to consult with the
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Alliance on a range of issues such as regional security, arms control, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, defense planning, and environmental security.271
Allies and partners are already exploring, via the EAPC, the possibilities for regional
security cooperation in the Black Sea region. The EAPC provides the political
dimension. It became the symbol of NATO’s strengthened political structure in the post-
Cold War era in a newly defined Euro-Atlantic Community whose members count for
46 states today.
5.2.2.2. Bilateral institutional mechanisms
The relations between NATO and Russia, and NATO and Ukraine have a great
deal of significance due to their implications on NATO’s ongoing enlargement process
and the security of the Black Sea region. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are among
the core countries of the region. NATO, like the EU, has special ties and interactions
with these countries. A stable expansion should not be imagined without the cooperative
engagement of these countries. Enhanced cooperation and new institutional ties have
been established with these countries in order to provide a more secure environment.
In May 1997 NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security. It has provided for enhanced Russian participation in all
NATO decision-making activities, equal status in peacekeeping operations and
representation at Alliance headquarters at the ambassadorial level. The NATO-Russian
Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was also established under the Founding Act. The
Council has provided each side with the opportunity for consultation and participation in
                                                          
271 Christopher Bell, op. cit., p. 5.
107
the other’s security decisions without a right of veto.272 These initiatives are of great
importance as it is hard to conceive of a viable European security structure that does not
take into account Russia and its potential contribution to enhancing stability.
Intensified and institutionalized NATO-Ukraine relations serve to strengthen
Ukraine’s participation in the ongoing effort throughout Europe to building cooperative
security. It is clear that this promotes greater stability in all regions, including the Black
Sea region, and subregions of the continent.273 The NATO-Ukraine Charter on
Distinctive Partnership, signed on May 30th, 1997, set up a distinct and effective
relationship between NATO and Ukraine. This partnership has endorsed NATO’s
support for Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and democratic
development.274
The NATO extension has contributed to further improvement of Ukraine’s
relations with its immediate neighbors to the west and facilitated bilateral dialogue and
solutions to existing problems. In the end, after several years of procrastination, a basic
political treaty, recognizing the inviolability of mutual borders, was signed between
Romania and Ukraine. This has also contributed to the rapprochement between Poland
and Ukraine.275 The NATO enlargement process has facilitated Ukrainian-Russian
relations. The growing rapprochement between NATO and Ukraine forced Russian
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politicians to reconsider their policy toward Ukraine. As a result, the two countries
resolved, at least for 20 years, their long-standing bilateral problem by signing three
agreements on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and on the Russian military and naval
base in Sevastopol. They also signed a treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and
Partnership at the end of May 1997. 276
5.2.3. Other contributions
NATO also contributes to the environmental security of the region by
supporting and financing some environmental projects in the region. The NATO Science
for Stability Program sponsored two multi-institutional projects, dealing with
“Ecosystem Modeling as a Management Tool for the Black Sea” (TU-BLACK SEA)
1993-1997 and “Wave Climatology of the Turkish Coast: Measurements-Analysis-
Modeling” (TU-WAVES) 1993-1998. The database management system for
environmental and oceanographic data was established at the Marine Hydrophysical
Institute at Sevastopol, Ukraine. The Special Working Group 12 (SWG/12) is another
NATO initiative, which promotes cooperation among NATO and PfP navies to comply
with national and international maritime environmental protection regulations and to
foster cooperative efforts for achieving environmentally sound ships and support
facilities. The SWG/12 has assisted the Romanian and Bulgarian navies, and is helping
to develop an oil-spill response contingency plan. The NATO CCMS sponsored a pilot
project devoted to a Review of Ongoing Black Sea Projects for Planning of Future
Activities. This project was terminated in 1997. This CCMS project, led by all coastal
states and the USA produced a “Black Sea Observation and Forecasting System Science
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Plan” provided recommendations for the implementation of a long-term operational
ocean observation and forecasting program for the Black Sea.277
In December 1997, NATO ministers of foreign affairs approved the
establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Center (EDRCC), and a non-
permanent Euro-Atlantic Disaster Unit (EDRU). The EDRCC was inaugurated in June
1998. All of the Black Sea countries are participants to this initiative. This represents
another symbol of cooperation in the region.
Cooperation and dialogue have become central instruments for NATO. In this
regard, all of the above-mentioned institutional mechanisms, including the EAPC and
PfP programs, have served as a basis for building closer relationships. Since their
creation, they have narrowed the gap between NATO members and its partners. They
have represented a very successful program of military and political cooperation and
become an essential component in building European cooperative security.278 It should
be noted that they have contributed to the security of the Black Sea region directly or
indirectly by providing training and security structures and by increasing the level of
cooperation between allies and regional states. Despite the fact that NATO’s
institutional mechanisms and its enlargement process promote more stability and
security in the Black Sea region, it should be stressed that the efforts of the countries in
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the region to build stable regional cooperation remain paramount in guaranteeing
security.279
5.3. The Role of the EU in the Black Sea Region
Since the end of the Cold War the EU has emerged as an important actor in the
Black Sea region. The EU is experiencing a very complex system of multifaceted
relations with individual countries in the Black Sea region. The activity of the EU in the
region is an important factor in the political and economic life of Black Sea countries,
especially after the conclusion of European Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania, the
candidate status of Turkey and the partnership and cooperation treaties with Ukraine,
Russia, Moldova and three Caucasian republics.280 All these developments have opened
up broad opportunities for interaction in region. In other words, the development of an
integrated system of relations between regional countries and the EU has already started.
Since the three Black Sea countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) are included in the
orbit of the enlargement process and Greece is already a full member, it is not difficult to
predict that enlargement will shift the boundaries of the EU eastward to shores of the
Black Sea.
The EU’s cooperative objectives in the Black Sea region are mainly based on
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with most of the countries in the
region. The Common Strategies with Russia and Ukraine form part of a proximity policy
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reflecting the political and strategic importance of the region to the EU.281 Timely and
brief analysis of the EU policy towards the Black Sea region may give some information
about the increasing importance of the Black Sea region for the EU. The role of the EU
in promoting regional cooperation in the Black Sea region might be understood by
examining the contributions of EU enlargement and the technical and financial
assistance programs developed and implemented by the EU.
5.3.1. The EU focus on the Black Sea region in the post-Cold War era
In the early 1990s, the EU presence in the Black Sea region could be described
in terms of “bilateralism”. This initially brought some constraints on EU’s relations with
the Black Sea area as a whole during this period.  During the years 1992-1994, Europe
coordinated its national foreign policies on a case-by-case basis, without collective
coherence and within a framework of diverse structures (CSCE, NATO, UN, and EEC).
With regard to the regional powers, the EC played a secondary role in the conflicts of
1992-1994, since the attempts to reconcile the two simultaneous processes of
enlargement to the east and deepening of engagement in the Balkan crises modified the
external priorities of the Union.282
In the period 1994-1999, after the freezing of regional conflicts in the region,
Europeans supported reforms initiated from the perspective of the eventual membership
of NIS, including states in the Black Sea region, in the Council of Europe. The EU also
has provided financial assistance to regional projects through various programs.
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However, the Commission is bureaucratic and slow, and according to European
diplomats, assistance has been poorly targeted with little positive effect on regional
stability and development. France has already cooperated with the US on peaceful
resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. Germany and Great Britain together with the US and
Turkey have provided security assistance to Georgia in the framework of bilateral
assistance programs.
By the mid-1990s, the EU increased interaction with subregional cooperative
initiatives in its “near neighborhood”. The EU has provided ideas, expertise and
financial support via its aid programs. Since the mid-1990s, EU leaders have repeatedly
stressed their support for subregional cooperation, emphasizing its importance in the
context of EU enlargement (in particular as a means of avoiding new dividing lines in
Europe). Leaders have called for greater utilization of EU political and economic
resources to promote concrete subregional cooperation.283 The EU’s foreign policy
strategy towards its neighboring subregions/regions has been broadly similar and
relatively coherent in that it has focused upon developing interaction to draw the
countries of each subregion, to a greater or lesser extent, within the ambit of the
Union.284 The EU has established a formal relation in terms of its foreign policy with
subregional organizations including the CBSS, Northern Dimension, the BEAC and
EMP.
The leverage of the EU in encouraging subregional cooperation in the Black
Sea region is much less than in Central Europe, where the prospects of EU membership
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is a real goal for such states.285 The BSEC’s relations with potential external suppliers of
funds for the project, particularly the EU and the EBRD, are less developed then those of
the CBSS, the BEAC and the CEI, though ties with the former are now expanding.  The
problem is that obviously not all EU states have the same level of interest in regional
plans. The EU’s approach concerning the attitudes toward intra-regional cooperation
schemes can be described as asymmetrical at best. Cultural affinities, assessments of
stability and pressures by neighboring and interested member states explain why the
Commission has placed much more emphasis on the CBSS, which lists the Commission
as one of its founding members, rather than the BSEC. One might argue that the EU
could have some difficulty in its policy towards the region for a number of reasons. The
Black Sea region is not among the top priorities for the EU in the view of current
internal structuring of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and more
immediate regional priorities are at its periphery, such as Central and South-Eastern
Europe.286 The diversity of the EU’s ties with the BSEC’s members might have
complicated EU financial support for BSEC activities.287
 The need for greater engagement was not recognized until the late 1990s. The
Commission’s 1997 report288 on the Black Sea and the BSEC stressed the growing
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importance of the region to the EU. It identified transport and energy networks, trade
cooperation, ecologically sustainable development, and justice and home affairs as
priorities for EU support. The European Commission, in its report to the Council in
1997, affirmed that “Enlargement will further increase the Black Sea region’s
significance to the European Union. The EU has a major interest in promoting political
stability and economic prosperity in the Black Sea region and stimulating the
development links both within the region and with the EU.” 289 In the years 1999-2002,
the EU declared its support for, and sometimes even became directly involved with,
European regional organizations charged with security. In a sense, ‘Agenda 2000’
approves the importance of regional cooperation by stating, “The importance of regional
cooperation will increase as the Union enlarges, as its development will promote the
openness of the enlarged Union towards its neighbors, so that no dividing lines are
drawn on the European Continent.”290
The signature of the PCAs with the three Caucasian states in June 1999 in
Luxembourg officially represented a substantial development in EU policy toward the
Black Sea region, in particular the Caucasus.291 Georgian forces in charge of assuring
the security of OSCE monitors received material support from the EU, financed by the
CFSP. The European Commission participated in an OSCE campaign for the destruction
of light weapons in the South Ossetia; it assisted in the rehabilitation of Azeri regions
liberated from Armenian occupation (EXXAP program); it developed measures based
on trust (rehabilitation of the Ingury power station between Abkhazia and Georgia); and
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it insisted on the closing (initially scheduled for 2004) of the Medzamor nuclear station.
In effect the EU could not offer the region genuine guarantees for its security. The
Caucasian states have never received any assurance that they would one day become
members of the Union. Only some European powers maintain a specific influence, like
France and the United Kingdom, in diplomatic groups with the variable geometry of the
OSCE of the United Nations. The more guarantees the EU has for the Turks for their
membership prospects, the more the hopes and efforts of the Caucasian states to pursue a
rapprochement with Europe will increase. 292
In late 1990s the EU, as a stabilizing factor in a volatile region, has closely and
increasingly observed the BSEC as a significant access point to Caspian and Central
Asian energy resources. Therefore, modernization of the regional infrastructure in
energy and transportation facilities connecting the Black Sea to Europe, regional
commercial cooperation and the creation of favorable conditions to attract EU and
foreign investment, sustainable development, environmental protection and nuclear
safety areas have been emphasized as priorities.293 Since 1997, EU representatives have
also been participating in meetings of the BSEC as observers. After the June 4th-5th,
1998 BSEC Council Summit in Yalta the EU Presidency on behalf of the EU declared
its full support for Black Sea Cooperation and admired the positive contribution of the
BSEC in the development of the region in several areas, including transport, power,
telecommunications, and the environment.294 In the declaration issued at the Yalta
Summit, emphasis was placed on relations between the BSEC and the EU with a view to
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forming a “EURO-BSEC” area.295 The EU also declared its willingness to contribute to
the regional cooperation in the Black Sea primarily through PHARE, TACIS, MEDA
and INTERREG programs.296
5.3.2. Contributions of the EU enlargement
On a bilateral level, the EU provides an environment for improving relations
between its new members. It also constitutes an environment in which new members can
find cooperative solutions to long-standing issues with neighboring countries. The
emphasis that both the EU and NATO place on neighborly relations among candidate
countries might be seen as a step in the right direction, on the path of integration, as it
accentuates the relevance of bilateral issues. 297 The EU has cultivated a close political
and economic interest in the Black Sea region. Bulgaria and Romania have launched
accession negotiations with the EU and Turkey is also a candidate for EU membership.
The EU has concluded PCAs with Former Soviet Union states, including Russia, in
order to promote economic and political reforms. PCAs with different partner states
provide for trade liberalization and wide ranging cooperation, in the field of
environment, justice and home affairs, energy, transport, telecommunications, border
networks and economic development, to name a few. TACIS is the main financial
instrument supporting the implementation of PCAs.298
EU candidates Romania and Bulgaria have cooperated with their neighbors,
including other Black Sea countries, for several reasons connected to their EU
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membership objective. Candidate countries were required to sign friendship treaties with
their neighbors and resolve any outstanding border disputes or cross-border minority
rights issues. In addition to meeting stated EU and NATO membership requirements,
EU candidate countries in the Black Sea region (as well as noncandidate countries) see
subregional cooperation as a step towards European integration and a means of
facilitating their membership objective. One should not forget the fact that subregional
cooperation remains a step towards Euro-Atlantic integration and not an alternative to
it.299
The incentive of EU and NATO membership has strengthened cooperation
among Black Sea states. The EU is better positioned and equipped to deal with
economic causes of political problems. In the long run, the prospect of membership in
the EU is a motivating factor for the member states of the BSEC that can contribute to
regional political and economic security. Nevertheless, the EU is not interested or
inclined to get directly involved in the solution of Black Sea conflicts. Although the EU
is against an excessive increase of Russian influence in the region, it considers the
Russian Federation a force of control in the Black Sea region to keep regional conflicts
within bounds.300 It is an undeniable fact that after the accession of Poland and Baltic
countries into the EU in May 2004, Russia’s potential role in the number of important
policy issues for Europeans, including environmental management, nuclear-waste
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management and nuclear-reactor safety, will be accentuated.301 In this regard, a
cooperative relationship with the Russian Federation has utmost importance for the
security of the whole continent.
It should be noted that the long-term interests of the Black Sea countries lie
with the EU, for the majority of BSEC members joining the EU remains the final
objective. Therefore, the promotion of regional cooperation is seen not as an alternative
but as part of a transition strategy towards European integration. The EU increasingly
sees the BSEC as a preliminary and complementary cooperation process for European
integration as part of an overall Pan-European strategy. 302 The EU is now making real
progress toward the goal of a substantial expansion to the east. At its Copenhagen
Summit on December 13th, 2002, the EU member states approved the enlargement of
the union to include ten new countries (Southern Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) by May 1st, 2004.
The admission of two more East European states, Bulgaria and Romania, is
contemplated for 2007. The decision on whether to commence negotiations with Turkey
on admission to the EU will be made in December 2004 (See Figure 5) 303.
Through the ongoing enlargement process, the EU territory will be extended to
a part of the Black Sea coastal area. Thus the challenge, and potential, of the Black Sea
area will be an issue of growing interest for the EU. 304 It is the fact that the enlargement
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of the EU to the east will also bring an eastward extension of a zone of stability and
prosperity. In this sense, the EU’s role in the promotion of the Black Sea cooperation
cannot be underestimated. The question of whether the EU can be enlarged without
drawing new boundaries, without forcing the other European states into a peripheral
position, is certainly one of the most important challenges facing the continent today.305
5.3.3. Role of the technical and financial assistance programs of the EU
Apart from the aid for Greece and candidate countries, the EU deploys some
technical assistance projects in the region, in specific fields, transport, energy,
privatization, environment, support for enterprises, etc.306 Technical assistance has
provided exclusively through external aid programs. The EU has funded a number of
regional co-operation projects in the Black Sea region, through TACIS307, PHARE,
INTERREG,308 MEDA, focusing in issues such as energy, transport, the environment,
and economic development generally- but also on such matters as justice and home
affairs, with support to a variety of groups, small businesses, and local government.
Historically, the EU has strongly supported regional cooperative projects provided that
they respect free world trade and good-neighborly relations.
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Figure 5: Map illustrates EU member states, candidate countries, and
others (as of April 2002)309
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Most of the Black Sea states benefit from the EU’s PHARE and TACIS
technical and assistance programs. As part of EU assistance to the Black Sea countries-,
which over the period 1991-1996 amounted to a total of 2,589 million euros – the EU
has already contributed significantly to promoting regional cooperation in the Black Sea
region. Over the same period an estimated 490 million euros in grants were provided for
the activities aimed specifically at strengthening regional cooperation in the Black Sea
region310: the TRACECA311 project; the INOGATE312 (Rehabilitation, Modernization
and Rationalization of Interstate Oil and Gas Pipelines in the NIS) and Black Sea
regional Energy Center programs in the field of energy; the Black Sea environment
program and other practical projects. 313 It can be said that since 1990, the EU has
delivered about 1 billion Euros for different cooperation programs in the Black Sea
region.314Over the past decade Russia has received direct financial assistance from the
EU averaging 200 million Euros for technical cooperation and development assistance
projects annually, with two-thirds of this amount being paid under the EU TACIS
program. The EU is already financing rehabilitation projects in both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The European Commission has a substantial aid program and has spent almost
one billion Euros in the Caucasus alone between 1991 and 2001.315 It should also be
stressed that many infrastructure programs has been implemented thanks to the external
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assistance of the EU. Some of them are of special importance from the point of
transportation, energy security, and economic security.
The promotion of transport networks focused on the development of the East-
West transport corridor from Europe, across the Black Sea region, through the Caucasus
and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia (TRACECA)316. This initiative aimed at supporting
the political and economic independence of the Caucasus and Central Asia countries by
enhancing their capacity to have access to European and world markets through
alternative transport routes and enhancing regional cooperation in the region.
Cooperation on transport policy of the countries in the region is making significant
progress, in the framework of the Basic Multilateral Agreement on International
Transport for the development of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia,
adopted in 1998 and ratified by 12 317countries. Russia has applied for observer status,
which offers the potential for linking the original corridor with transport networks in
South Russia and the Black Sea ports in Turkey. It has provided the EU a leading role in
the region as regards transport policy discussions. Emphasis is now given to the
consolidation of the corridor, including the implementation of the Multilateral
Agreement on Transport, strengthening the legal framework, improving transport
security and safety as well as consideration of environmental aspects.
The INOGATE program is another infrastructure program. It aims at enhancing
regional cooperation between producers, transit and consumer countries for interstate oil
and gas transport projects, reducing investment risks and promoting the introduction of
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international standards and environmental and safety concerns in the energy network
infrastructure. It paves the way to the rehabilitation and optimization of the East-West
oil and gas corridors in compliance with EU and international norms and standards of
construction, operation, safety and environmental protection. 318INOGATE has also
improved the regional trade on oil and gas, in compliance with international standards
and operations, and helped to build a wee-balanced energy policy, based on supply
diversification and security.
In the field of energy, the EU is developing projects of common interest to
expand trans-European energy networks. The aim is to create a more favorable
environment to consolidate these networks and help diversity the sources of the EU’s
energy supplies.319 The establishment of the Black Sea Regional Energy Center
(BSREC)320 at the beginning of 1995 in Sofia has been an important institutional
development in the regional cooperation in energy. The EU sponsored this project. All
BSEC member states and Macedonia participate in BSREC. To reinforce cooperation
between the EU and the Black Sea countries in energy sector is the main aim of this
center.321
However, the EU involvement in the BSEC framework has been minimal
(except for the funding of some isolated projects such as the Black Sea Regional Energy
Center in Sofia, the Black Sea environmental projects as well as smaller ones, like the
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business plans of the BSTDB, and the ICBSS).322 One can say that the EU Commission
is acting cautiously at the present time, whatever its general goodwill. The EU Council
does not have a mandate on the BSEC. It is neither a member of the BSEC, nor an
observer at that time. But, it should be noted that at a regional level the EU is expanding
cooperation with the BSEC. In the fields of energy, transportation and
telecommunications in particular, the EU is heavily involved in activities in the Black
Sea region by encouraging the development of Trans-European Networks (TENs)323,
and by funding programs such as TRACECA and INOGATE.324
The BSEC agreed upon a Platform of Cooperation for future structured
relations with the EU in 1999. The BSEC-EU Platform of Cooperation was announced,
which referred to future cooperation in several areas. The main areas, in which the
BSEC determined to develop cooperation with the EU, were transport, energy, and
telecommunications infrastructure; trade and the foreign direct investment; sustainable
development and environmental protection, including nuclear safety, science and
technology, and combating terrorism and organized crime, communications.325 The
regional cooperative initiatives in the Black Sea region have broader political, economic,
and social objectives and activities are a major impetus for regional cooperation between
Black Sea countries.  Through its programs, the EU is a major actor in cooperation areas
covered by them.
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To put it more precisely, the EU is among the main organizations projecting
security, economic development and stability to the Black Sea region. The ongoing
enlargement process of the EU, PCAs with most of the Black Sea countries and its
technical and financial assistance to the projects on transportation, energy infrastructure,
and environmental protection have contributed directly or indirectly to the security in the
region to some extent. The focus of the EU on Black Sea region will inevitably increase
due to the current EU enlargement process and deepening integration in the EU within
the framework of the CSDP. Thus, the EU will intensify its cooperative efforts in the
region. That’s why, its role in the regional dynamics of the Black sea region will
doubtlessly become more important than today.
To summarize, the role of wider European organizations is vital for the peace,
security and stability in the Black Sea region. The OSCE, the EU and NATO should
address the issues of how they can best promote regional/subregional cooperation and
how they might usefully cooperate with subregional and regional groups. It should be
noted that the linkage of Black sea countries to the broader European integration process
remains the main reason for their participation in regional frameworks. Regional
cooperative initiatives are perceived as the available tools or means, and as a first step
towards further integration. Wider European organizations thus have a central role to
play in the build-up of regional cooperation. Therefore, the enlargement door should be
kept open for regional cooperation to succeed.326
The OSCE efforts in the conflict areas of the region, the enlargement processes
of NATO and the EU together with their multidimensional assistance programs have
been among the most stabilizing factors in the Black Sea region. It can be said that their
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coordinated political, military, economic, social and environmental activities and their
support for regional cooperative initiatives in the Black Sea region continue to be the
main forces for providing peaceful relations in compatible with cooperative security in
the region.
                                                                                                                                                                          
326 Sophia Clement, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The end of the bipolar rivalry provided states with the opportunity of acting
more freely especially at the regional level. In the post-Cold War era, a dynamic re-
emergence of regional/subregional and local ties is being witnessed. From the Barents
Sea area, the Baltic Sea region, through Central Europe and the Balkans down to the
Black Sea region, new frameworks and institutions have been established and a lot of
initiatives have been taken since the end of the Cold War, sometimes with the support of
outside powers and sometimes by regional countries acting on their own. It can be said
that, these initiatives complement the pan-European strategy. They indicate that the
security understanding has greatly changed with wider security agendas and new levels
of analysis.
 Organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment were
invaluable in guiding thought and action in the Cold War era; cooperative security,
however, is the corresponding principle for international security in the Post-Cold War
era. Taken into account the most of the post-Cold War realities of international relations,
the concept of cooperative security seems the most appropriate and consistent concept
with the analytical framework providing us with analytical tools for examining the
security relations among the countries situated in the Black Sea region. Cooperative
security suggests a wider security agenda and cooperation among all kinds of actors in
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the international arena. It confirms the idea that international relations follow its way
through interactions among different levels of international relations. Additionally, it
helps to promote a broader approach to security going far beyond the traditional politico-
military focus. In this regard, the activities of the regional cooperative security initiatives
such as BSEC, GUUAM, and the BLACKSEAFOR and the cooperative role of the
OSCE, NATO, and the EU can be analyzed more meaningfully within the framework of
the concept of cooperative security.
Today, the Black Sea area is certainly more of a region than it was in early
1990s. The Black Sea region can be defined as the area covered by the eleven states
participating in the BSEC. Thus, from a broader perspective, the region comprises an
eleven-member subsystem connecting the European Union to Southeastern Europe, the
Trans-Caucasus NIS and the former Soviet Union to the Middle East. Greece, Russia,
Turkey, and Ukraine (in alphabetical order) can be classified as the main regional
players in the Black Sea region, due to their relatively higher capabilities and their
important geographical locations. But, it should be noted that the Black Sea region is a
region in being. The process has not been completed yet.
 The Black Sea region has a growing significance. It is located at geopolitical
and economic crossroads between Europe and Asia. Provided the region’s geostrategic
position linking Europe and Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes an
indispensable trade link and transit route. The enlargement processes of the EU and
NATO will increasingly transform the region in Europe’s direct neighborhood. That’s
why the Black Sea Region’s security and stability will become vital for European
security. The process of EU enlargement and increasing BSEC-EU interaction will
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further contribute to the expanding role of the Black Sea region and its growing
influence on the adjacent Middle East and Central Asia.
There are various conflictual and problematic issues in the Black Sea region.
Conflicts in Chechnya and Karabakh, Abkhazia-Georgia and Ossetia-Georgia,
Transdniestr and Ingushetia-North Ossetia constitute the most important ones.
Additionally, disputes between Greece and Turkey, Russia and Ukraine affected
cooperative relations badly. These developments have prioritized military dimension of
the security. Despite the fact that there have been many issues concerning the political,
economical, societal and ecological dimensions of security, they have stayed under the
shadow of military security. The secessionist forces demand self-determination and
independence, while the governments of the countries from which they wish to secede
struggle to preserve the territorial integrity of their countries. As a result, although the
cease-fires that have been reached can delay further violence, the underlying political
conflicts are unlikely to be completely resolved in the near future. The existing
cooperative security initiatives have little success in removing tensions and problems
among their participants and within the member countries. They however occasionally
succeeded to prevent conflicts from dominating all aspects of the cooperative
relationships. Economic development, environmental degradation, illegal drug
trafficking, terrorism, and ensuring energy security are the other concerns necessitating
cooperative efforts.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, new regional initiatives have emerged in the
region. The BSEC, the GUUAM and the BLACKSEAFOR can be named as the most
important and the most efficient regional cooperative arrangements in the Black Sea
region. From a wider perspective, these initiatives can be perceived as elements
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contributing to peace and stability not only in the region, but also in the whole European
continent. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project (BSEC) has promoted the
intensification of regional cooperation and a perception of emerging common interests
and is seen as an important CBM in the region. GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan, and Moldavia) is an organization promoting political and economic
cooperation. Plans for the creation of a joint peace keeping battalion remain on the
agenda of GUUAM. Ukraine’s initiative to enlarge the scope of regional CSBMs to
naval area and Turkish initiative on a Special Task Force on Military and Naval
Cooperation (BLACKSEAFOR) are among the cooperative security endeavors aiming
to strengthen military and naval confidence as well as regional security. The general
conclusion is that these regional initiatives provide decisive progress in the peace
building process, contribute democratization, increase security, and support
macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms, as well as integration of the region
into the European structures and rest of the world. They provide a platform for regional
cooperation and stabilization (both bilateral and multilateral), help the process of
European integration of the countries in the region. They also help to re-establish and
develop a regional sense of community and common responsibility. They offer an
additional platform for political dialogue and concrete cooperation.
The cooperative security efforts of the OSCE, NATO and the EU have
undoubtedly promoted security and stability in the Black Sea region. Contributions of
the wider European Organizations, including the OSCE, NATO, and the EU to the
peace, security and the stability of the Black Sea region may also be seen in compliance
with the core principles of cooperative security.  The OSCE efforts in the conflict areas
of the region, the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU together with their
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multidimensional assistance programs, through their institutional mechanisms, have
been among the most stabilizing factors in the Black Sea region. It can be said that their
coordinated political, military, economic, social and environmental activities and their
support for regional cooperative initiatives continue to be the main forces for providing
peaceful relations in conformity with the idea of cooperative security in the region.
All the Black Sea states and their peoples are well aware of the fact that
economic recovery, peace and stability in the region are their common interests. They
also should see regional cooperation is the most promising strategy for obtaining these
goals. In this context, transformation of the conflicts of interests in the region into the
cooperative efforts of the interested parties might allow all countries to enjoy long
lasting peace, prosperity and sustainable growth within the region. Cooperation among
the Black Sea countries and the wider BSEC members is critically important because it
has the potential to bridge Europe and Asia. For both security and economic reasons,
regional/subregional cooperation has positive implications for countries in the region as
well as for the rest of Europe.
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APPENDIX 1
YALTA SUMMIT DECLARATION327
Yalta, 5 June 1998
1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the Participating States of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC), have met in Yalta on 5 June 1998 to assess the progress
of the BSEC since its inception by the Istanbul Declaration of 25 June 1992 and to give
guidance for its future course and development. We all share the conviction that the
considerable progress achieved in our multilateral economic cooperation contributes to
enhancing peace, stability and security to the benefit of our peoples, and that time has
come to consolidate the international legal personality of the BSEC. To that end we
signed the Charter of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, an act
which transforms the existing intergovernmental mechanism into a fully-fledged
regional economic organization.
2. We share the common view that in the 21st century the role of the Black Sea region,
both in world politics and in the global economy, will grow substantially, due to its
strategic location and vast economic potential. The BSEC should adapt itself to a world
of overall transition and rapid change, embracing new areas of cooperation while
deepening the cooperation in the existing ones. This requires a new BSEC economic
agenda for the future, in order to meet the challenges of the era of globalization and
information society, to stimulate economic growth and innovation, to create employment
and build on the synergy that exists between our countries.
3. We reaffirm our commitment to trade liberalization and harmonization of foreign
trade regimes, with due regard to the WTO rules and practices. We attach particular
importance to the implementation of the existing agreements between the BSEC
Participating States and the EU, as well as accession of all Black Sea States to the WTO,
as important first steps in that direction and appeal to the EU and WTO to give the
BSEC the necessary support to achieve these goals. We also reconfirm our political will
to gradually establish a BSEC Free Trade Area as a long-term objective and to elaborate
a Plan of Action of a staged process to that end.
4. We are convinced that the private sector should be the driving force for the
consolidation of the BSEC process, so that the aim to complement cooperation between
governments by cooperation among the business communities be achieved. We support
the involvement of the private sector in the development and implementation of the
concrete projects of interest to the BSEC Participating States.
5. We express our deep satisfaction with the establishment, early this year, of the Black
Sea Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki, which will be the main financial
pillar of the BSEC and expect it to commence its operations soon. It will give a new
quality to the BSEC, whose activities are now evolving from the stage of project
                                                          
327 Available at www.bsec.gov.tr/summit_.htm/
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development into the stage of project implementation. We appeal to the international
banking and financial institutions to strongly support the BSTDB and consider ways and
means to participate in its activities.
6. We consider project implementation to be of crucial importance for the consolidation
and further development of the BSEC process, especially the implementation of such
projects, which create new shared values and generate interaction among the interested
states. In this connection, we assess positively the idea of selecting priority areas of
cooperation and designating country coordinators on those areas. This new set-up will
increase the efficacy of project execution by a strengthened commitment of the
Participating States to take the lead in their implementation.
7. The BSEC will further develop its already established cooperation with the European
Commission, OSCE, WTO, UN/ECE, UNIDO and other international organizations on
the basis of complementarity, comparative advantage and subsidiarity. It should further
elaborate the modalities for cooperation with the Central European Initiative (CEI), the
Royaumont Process of Stability and Good-Neighborliness in South-Eastern Europe, the
Process on Stability, Security and Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, the South-East
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and explore the possibility to establish
cooperation with other interested regional initiatives. We expect that the Organization of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation be accorded an Observer status in the UN General
Assembly.
8. In this cooperation, the BSEC-EU relationship is of a particular importance. We
welcome the Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers of last December as a first step
in the elaboration of a comprehensive strategy of the EU towards the BSEC and its
Participating States. We fully share the view that the BSEC-EU cooperation in the fields
of transport, energy, telecommunication networks, trade, ecology, sustainable
development, justice and home affairs has a promising future. The ultimate aim is to
progressively shape the EURO-BSEC economic area.
9. The BSEC has gradually become an attractive partner for cooperation, both for states
from our region and beyond. We commend Austria, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovak
Republic and Tunisia for their constructive participation in the BSEC events as
Observers. At the same time we express our gratitude to those states who have applied
for membership or observer status and appreciate their desire to become a part of the
BSEC family. We agree to discuss the issue of enlargement after the Charter of the
Organization of the BSEC enters into force. We will be in a position to address the issue
of granting observer or other appropriate status to countries and a number of NGOs in
due course.
10. It is our belief that now the BSEC serves more than one purpose. It is an
indispensable complementary means to accelerate economic and social progress and
hence to consolidate the democratic institutions of all our countries. It is also a
preparatory ground for integration into the united Europe of the 21st century. It presents
a historic opportunity to build up, step-by-step, our common future together through
mutual cooperation at all levels- state to state, region to region, people to people- so that
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the Black Sea region becomes one of the economic areas of attraction for investment, of
prosperity and stability in the next century.
11. We call upon the National Parliaments to ratify, accept or approve the Charter of the
Organization as soon as possible, being convinced that the Parliamentary Assembly of
the BSEC will also assist in this respect. We highly appreciate the valuable contribution
of the PABSEC to the development of the BSEC process, for the prosperity of all and
each of the countries here represented.
12. We express our gratitude to the Government and the people of Ukraine for their
warm hospitality and excellent organization of the Summit.
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APPENDIX 2
YALTA GUUAM CHARTER328
The Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of
Uzbekistan and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as “the GUUAM”,
Guided by the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris
Charter for New Europe and the Charter for European Security of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Reaffirming the provisions of the Strasbourg Declaration of 10 October 1997, the
Washington Declaration of 24 April 1999 and the New York Memorandum of 6
September 2000 of the GUUAM Heads of State,
Being devoted to the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and
freedoms, rule of law and market economy,
Acknowledging that regional cooperation is a part of globalization processes, and may
contribute to consolidation of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the
GUUAM Member States, promote peaceful settlement of conflicts and improve well-
being of their peoples,
Proceeding from traditional friendly relations among the GUUAM Member States and
their peoples,
Have agreed to adopt the present Charter,
1.Objectives of cooperation of the GUUAM:
o promoting social and economic development;
o strengthening and expanding trade and economic links;
o development and effective use in the interest of GUUAM states of the
transport and communication arteries with its corresponding
infrastructure situated in their territories;
o strengthening of the regional security in all spheres of activity;
o developing relations in the field of science and culture and in the
humanitarian sphere;
o interacting in the framework of international organizations;
o combating international terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking.
 
                                                          
328 Available at www.guuam.org.
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2. Principles of cooperation of the GUUAM:
Cooperation within the GUUAM is based on the universally recognized principles and
norms of international law, in particular, on the respect for sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs of the Member States.
3. Directions of cooperation of the GUUAM:
o economy, science, technology and environment;
o transport, energy and telecommunication infrastructure;
o joint investment and financial projects;
o humanitarian sphere, culture, education, mass media, tourism, youth
exchange;
o other directions of mutual interest.
4. The Member States may submit proposals regarding the broadening of the
cooperation spheres.
5. The GUUAM is open for new members, which fully confirm their full adherence
to the objectives and principles of the GUUAM, set forth in its fundamental
documents including the present Charter.
6. Organizational structure of the GUUAM:
6.1 The Annual Meeting of the Heads of State is the GUUAM highest body.
The presidency in the GUUAM is carried out by the Member States in alphabetical
order for the period between the Meetings of the Heads of State.
At the Meetings of the Heads of State the decisions are made up:
o on the principal directions of political, economic and
humanitarian cooperation within the GUUAM;
o on the establishment of the GUUAM specialized bodies;
o on the coordination of positions regarding urgent
international life issues of mutual interest.
6.2 The Sessions of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which are conducted, as a
rule, twice a year constitute the GUUAM executive body.
The issues of implementation of agreements within the GUUAM are considered
and the proposals on further development and deepening of the cooperation for
consideration at the Meetings of Heads of State are also prepared at the sessions of the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
6.3 The GUUAM working body is the Committee of National Coordinators
(CNC), consisting of national coordinators, one from each Member State, appointed by
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
The CNC coordinates the activities among Member States within the GUUAM,
ensures preparation of the Meetings of the Heads of State and the Sessions of the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
The CNC sessions are conducted quarterly in turn in the territory of the Member
States. Upon the proposal of any Member States, the CNC extraordinary sessions may
be conducted.
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7. The decisions within the GUUAM are made by consensus.
8. The GUUAM working languages are Russian and English.
Done at the city of Yalta on the 7th of June 2001, in a single true copy in the Azerbaijani,
English, Georgian, Moldovian, Russian, Uzbek and Ukrainian languages, each of them
being authentic.
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APPENDIX 3
 MAP OF GUUAM COUNTRIES329
                                                          
329 Available at www.guuam.org.
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APPENDIX 4
MILESTONES OF BLACKSEAFOR330
  DATE : ACTIVITY :
20-21 October 1998 1st Expert Meeting/Ankara-TURKEY. Participants agreed on the
Draft Concept Document.
16-18 December 1998 2nd Expert Meeting/Constanta-ROMANIA. Draft Establishment
Agreement, TOR’s of Planning Group (PG) and Black Sea Naval
Commander’s Committee (BSNC) revised.
24-26 February 1999 3rd Expert Meeting/İstanbul-TURKEY.Worked on Draft
Agreement and TOR’s.
4-8 October 1999 4th Expert Meeting/Constanta-ROMANIA.
6-10 December 1999 5th Expert Meeting/İstanbul-TURKEY. Progress has been
achieved on finalizing the work on the Establishment Agreement.
15-17 March 2000 6th Expert Meeting/Varna-BULGARIA. Agreed on the Draft text
of the LETTER OF INTENT (LOI) and decided to propose this
text to be signed at the level of senior officials.
17-18 April 2000 Coordination Meeting/İstanbul-TURKEY. The Signatories
reiterated their willingness to speed up their efforts for finalizing
the Agreement.
15-17 May 2000 7th Expert Meeting/Odessa-UKRAINE. The Status of Forces
(SOF) text agreed in principle. Considered the possibility to sign
the LETTER OF INTENT (LOI) in June in Ankara.
28 June 2000 LETTER OF INTENT (LOI) signed by the ambassadors of Black
Sea Littoral States in Ankara.
5-7 July 2000 8th Expert Meeting/Tiblisi-GEORGIA. Substantial progress has
been achieved on the Draft Agreement, and Final Status of the
Article about “Accession” has been determined. At the same
meeting it was decided to have a unique flag and logo for the
force, and an annex to the agreement concerning financial matters.
26-28 July 2000 9 th Expert Meeting/Moscow-RF. Status Of the Forces (SOF),
Financial matters, the flag and logo were finalized.
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31 January 2001 BLACKSEAFOR agreement and its annexes were agreed and the
agreement was approved by nations through silence procedure.
10-11 March 2001 1st Planning Group Meeting was held in Tbilisi/GEORGIA.
2 April 2001 BLACKSEAFOR agreement was signed by Ministers and their
authorized representatives at the signing ceremony in İstanbul.
19 April 2001 A decision was taken by BSNC at its first meeting in TBILISI to
activate the BLACKSEAFOR on 27 September 2001 in İstanbul.
14-16 May 2001 2nd Planning Group Meeting was held in Constanta/ROMANIA,
where BLACKSEAFOR Concept and TORs (BSN-01) and
Standing Orders (BSN-02) were finalized.
3-5 September 2001 3rd BLACKSEAFOR Planning Group (PG) Meeting and
Operational Planning Conference (OPC) took place in İstanbul
and Activation Operation Order (ACTOPORD-01) was finalized
and distributed.
27 September 2001 BLACKSEAFOR First Activation Ceremony took place in
GÖLCÜK.
28 Sept.- 16 Oct. 2001 BLACKSEAFOR First Activation Period was conducted.
13-14 February 2002 BLACKSEAFOR-02 1ST Planning and BSNC Coordination
Meeting was held in Sevastopol/UKRAINE.
13 February 2002 The Chairmanship of BLACKSEAFOR Planning Group
transferred from TURKEY to UKRAINE.
15-16 April 2002 The Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee Coordination
meeting was held in Yalta/UKRAINE.
18 April 2002 The Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee meeting –
Yalta/UKRAINE
05-06 June 2002 The final Planning Group meeting for the Second Activation was
held in Sevastopol/UKRAINE.
21 June 2002 The Agreement on foundation of BLACKSEAFOR has been
ratified by Georgian Parliament.
8 August 2002 BLACKSEAFOR Change Of Command Ceremony was executed
in Sevastopol/UKRAINE.
5-28 August 2002 BLACKSEAFOR Second Activation Period was conducted.
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